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PARENTAL REFUSAL OF CONSENT FOR TREATMENT OF
HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS: COMPARING CASE RESULTS IN
ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES
Your children are not your children
They are the sons and daughters of Life's longing for itself
They come through you but not from you
And though they are with you yet they belong not to you.
-Kahlil Gibran, The Prophet, 1923
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the legal dilemmas resulting from major advances in medi-
cal technology during the past quarter century is the issue of whether
parents can refuse consent for treatment of handicapped newborns.1
Historically, the practice of allowing or causing the death of newborns
with birth defects was commonplace throughout western civilization.2
The advent of neonatal intensive care units (NICUs) and other medical
technological advances, however, has presented legal systems with a
quandary of how much treatment the law requires, or indeed, if treat-
ment is required at all.8
This Note will compare the two leading cases on parental treat-
ment refusals in England and the United States. In England, the Court
of Appeal decided In re B. (A Minor)4 on August 7, 1981. The infant,
1. See, e.g., In re B. (A Minor), [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421 (C.A. 1982); Weber v. Stony
Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685 (2d Dep't 1983), aff'd per curiam, 60
N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983) (commonly known as the "Baby
Jane Doe" case). The Appellate Division wrote a per curiam opinion as well.
2. See generally Moseley, The History of Infanticide in Western Society, in 1 Is-
SUES IN LAW & MED. 345, 351 (1986). The limits of such practice hold interesting views
for the future, as well. For an example of the possibilities, see Stillborn Ends Infant
Transplant Case in California, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1988, at B10, col. 3.
3. The first experimental NICUs were developed in Toronto, Montreal, and London
in 1961-62. By 1963, a unit was developed at Vanderbilt Medical Center in Nashville,
Tennessee. NICUs were established steadily on both sides of the Atlantic until, by 1973,
they appeared in most larger hospitals. See J. LYON, PLAYING GOD IN THE NURSERY 97-
100 (1985) Mr. Lyon's book begins with a narrative account of the "Baby Doe" case in
Bloomington, Indiana, and continues with an in-depth overview of the topic, as well as
chronicling the relative cases pertinent to the issues discussed herein. Events described
in the book are mostly derived from the court transcripts and interviews with the parties
involved. Id.
4. [1981] 1 W.L.R. at 1421.
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ten days old at the time of appeal, was born with Down's syndrome
and intestinal blockage. Weber v. Stony Brook Hospital,5 a 1983 case
in the New York State courts, involved an infant seventeen days old at
the time of final appeal, born with myelomeningocele (spina bifida),
microcephaly and hydrocephalus.6 In both cases, health care personnel
reported the parents' refusal of consent to the surgery necessary to
prevent the infants' deaths.'
The issues raised, battled over and balanced in these cases go right
to the heart of familial relationships, privacy and individual autonomy.
These cases both involved situations where the courts were called upon
to review a parental decision regarding the care of their infant. The
courts had to decide whether the parents' decisions not to treat life-
threatening birth defects with the most extensive surgical remedies
were consistent with the infants' best interests. If not, the courts then
had to decide if they would replace the parents' decisions with an order
to have surgery performed.
Ostensibly, the paramount issue is the newborn's right to live or,
as an incompetent, to be allowed to die. The infant's right to life is the
same as that of any other individual, and grounded in common law and
statutes in England and the United States.' For the infant in New
York, there are also federal and state constitutional protections of such
rights.9
These cases, however, represent a departure from the issues ar-
gued in well-known cases involving refused medical treatment which
would result in the death of the patient.10 Those issues are framed by
5. 95 A.D.2d 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685 (2d Dep't), aff'd per curiam, 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456
N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983).
6. Microcephaly is a congenital condition where the head is smaller than normal. TA-
BER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 891 (14th ed. 1981). Hydrocephalus is an enlarge-
ment of the head resulting from the pressure of fluid buildup within the skull. Id. at 676.
7. In re B. (A Minor), [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421, 1422 (C.A. 1982); see J. LYON, supra
note 3, at 46.
8. In England, see C. v. S., [1987] 1 All E.R. 1230 (Q.B.). In the United States, see
Scholendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914) (common-
law right of a competent adult to determine what is done with one's own body includes
the right to refuse medical treatment, even if death will result).
9. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, cl. 1; see N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 3; see also Riga,
Euthanasia, the Right to Die and Privacy: Observation on Some Recent Cases, 11 LIN-
COLN L. REV. 109, 133 (1982).
10. In New York, the leading case is In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266 (consolidated with In re Eichner, commonly known as the "Brother Fox"
case), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). The leading case outside of New York, and per-
haps the most well-known case, is In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied
sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Other well-known cases outside of
New York include: Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626
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an assertion of the individual's rights against countervailing state in-
terests. The individual's rights may be based on common law,' federal
and state constitutions, 2 and state statutes. 3 The countervailing state
(1986); Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); Satz v. Perl-
mutter, 379 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1980); and Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
11. 52 N.Y.2d at 363, 420 N.E.2d at 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 266. The Eichner decision
extended the Schloendorff rule to include incompetents who are in a permanent vegeta-
tive state with no hope of recovery when there is clear and convincing evidence as to the
incompetent's desire, made while competent, to have medical treatment withheld or
withdrawn, so long as there is no countervailing state interest. Id. at 377-79, 420 N.E.2d
at 70-71, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 272-73. Brother Fox survived a stroke and was kept alive only
through means of a respirator. Id. at 371, 420 N.E.2d at 67, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269. The
evidence presented in this case was Brother Fox's assertion, made before his stroke, that
if he were ever in the same medical condition as Karen Ann Quinlan, he would refuse
life-sustaining treatment. Id., 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270; see also Delio v.
Westchester County Medical Center, 129 A.D.2d 1, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677 (2d Dep't 1987)
(Eichner rule extended to include artificial feeding by tube as medical treatment which
may be refused, following similar decisions on the feeding tube issue in California, Flor-
ida, Massachusetts and New Jersey). Accord In re Westchester County Medical Center,
200 N.Y.L.J. 21 (1988) (court permitted withdrawal of nasogastric tube feeding from a
77-year-old woman on intravenous feeding, but required the petitioner to move the pa-
tient to a health care facility willing to remove the tube if the Medical Center refused to
do so.); cf. In re Alderson, 200 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1988) (court denied permission to withdraw
nasogastric feeding tube from 44-year-old man in a coma for two years because the evi-
dence presented regarding his desire to have artificial feeding discontinued did not meet
the clear and convincing standard). In re O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534
N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988) (court denied permission to withdraw nasogastric tube feeding be-
cause incompetent's previously made statements that she did not wish to be kept alive
by artificial means was not clear and convincing evidence that she would have refused
food-and-water sustenance by artificial feeding). In light of O'Connor and Alderson, one
may wonder whether the Court of Appeals's holding in Eichner, that court permission
for withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment need not be sought if the clear and
convincing evidence exists, has any bite since a challenge to that determination can al-
ways be raised by an unwilling medical professional or health care facility.
12. See, e.g., 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664. An excessive indulgence in alcohol and
drugs put Karen Ann Quinlan in a comatose state. After she spent eighteen months on a
respirator, her parents wished to have it removed. When the hospital objected, the par-
ents petitioned the court, asserting that their wishes were in accordance with what their
daughter would have wanted. The court granted the relief sought based on the constitu-
tional right to privacy, which the United States Supreme Court first developed under the
penumbra doctrine in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, Justice
Douglas reasoned that the right to privacy emanated from the guarantees provided by
the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments. Id; see also In re Conroy, 98 N.J.
321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) (Quinlan rule extended to include artificial feeding by tube as
medical treatment which may be refused).
Two federal district courts have held in an opposite fashion as to whether Justice
Douglas's right to privacy theory encompasses a constitutional right to die. U.S. Judge
Oks 'Right to Die', Nat'l L. J., Nov. 7, 1988 at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter Nat'l L. J.]. In an
unreported opinion, the Central District Court of California held it did not, and there-
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interests are the preservation of the lives of its citizens, prevention of
suicide and protection of health care professionals and institutions
from criminal and civil liability."
For competent persons, the right to die in England and New York
is inherent in the common-law right to refuse medical treatment.'5
Without consent, even the administration of life-saving medical treat-
ment violates the patient's legal rights." In the case of an incompetent,
however, the right to die is circumspect because of the legal inability to
obtain consent. This right has been recognized for incompetents in a
number of jurisdictions variously based upon an extension of the com-
mon-law right, as in New York,17 or the doctrine of "substituted
judgment.'"
fore such issues are a matter to be decided under state law. Sanchez v. Fairview Develop-
mental Center, 88-0129 (C.D. Cal. 1988). Later, however, the Rhode Island District Court
held that "patients have the right to refuse medical treatment, including feeding tubes,
when they fall into persistent vegetative states." Nat'l L. J., supra, at 1 (citing Gray v.
Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988)). Gray represents the "first thorough legal analy-
sis of the basis for that right in the United States Constitution." Nat'l L. J., supra, at 1.
Mrs. Gray became permanently unconscious as a result of a massive cerebral hemorrhage
on Jan. 4, 1986. Id. at 7. Her husband, Glenn, petitioned the court for permission to
order removal of an artificial feeding tube. In the Gray opinion, Chief Judge Francis J.
Boyle also held that the hospital must comply promptly with the petition's withdrawal
order, despite its objections thereto, if it cannot find another health care facility willing
to do so. Id.
13. 52 N.Y.2d at 376, 420 N.E.2d at 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 272 (citing N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW §§ 2504 (McKinney 1985), 2805-d (McKinney 1989); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 4401-
a (McKinney 1989)).
14. Id; see also Smith, Life and Death Decisions in the Nursery: Standards and
Procedures For Withholding Lifesaving Treatment From Infants, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
1125, 1134-36 (1982).
15. In England, see McKay v. Essex Area Health Auth., 11982) 1 Q.B. 1166; see also
Bolam v. Friern Hosp. Management Comm., [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582 (Q.B.); 30 HALSBURY'S
LAWS OF ENGLAND MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS & MEDICAL PRACTICE, 1 43; 11 HALSBURY'S
CRIMINAL LAW, 1210, 1213 (4th ed. 1973); W. RODGERS, WINFIELD & JOLOWlCZ ON TORT
706-08 (12th ed. 1984). In the United States, see In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d
64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); 129 A.D.2d 1, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677.
16. W. RODGERS, supra note 15, at 708 (citing Marshall v. Curry, [1933] 3 D.L.R. 260
(K.B.)); see also 52 N.Y.2d at 377, 420 N.E.2d at 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
17. 52 N.Y.2d at 379, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
18. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 44, 355 A.2d 647, 666, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v.
New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). The "substituted judgment" doctrine is one whereby
the constitutional right of an incompetent to refuse medical treatment is exercised by a
person who is in close association with the incompetent; for instance, as was the case
here, a family member. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the individual's right
to privacy requires that the state provide a means whereby an incompetent person may
assert the same right that a competent person has in refusing medical treatment, even if
death would result. Id. Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, involved a petition by a mother of an
adult, severely retarded man for permission to refuse life-sustaining blood transfusions
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At first blush, these theories seem applicable to newborns because
they are incompetents. Both theories, however, present weak argu-
ments in a newborn's case because each theory relies to some degree
upon a previous history of the intentions and attitudes of the incompe-
tent.' Judicial gloss on the common-law rule requires clear and con-
vincing evidence as to the incompetent's desire, made while competent,
to have medical treatment withheld or withdrawn. 0 Newborns clearly
fall outside that rule. Even a substituted judgment theory falls short in
the case of a newborn because the decision-maker is supposed to de-
cide based upon what decision the incompetent himself would have
made. "
This may explain why cases of parental refusal of consent for
treatment of defective newborns do not present arguments over the in-
fant's right to die, but rather over the parental right to choose medical
treatment for the child. The courts in the topic cases did not address
the mainstream treatment refusal issues. Instead, the primary issue ad-
for her son. The mother argued that if her son were competent, he would choose to
refuse treatment. The court held it could not grant the permission sought since Storar
had never been competent. This decision represents the New York Court of Appeals's
rejection of the traditional substituted judgement doctrine, which has no requirement for
proof of actual competent desires. But see In re Joseph v. Gardner, infra note 21.
19. Id.; 52 N.Y.2d at 378-79, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
20. Id. at 378, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274; see also Saunders v. State, 129
Misc. 2d 45, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510 (Nassau Co. Sup. Ct. 1985) (declaratory judgment recog-
nizing a "living will" as clear and convincing evidence). For an overview of New Jersey
administrative and legislative activity regarding living wills, see N.J. Panel Endorses
"Living Wills", The Record, Dec. 30, 1988, at Al, col. 1. The matters addressed by the
State Bioethics Commission and members of both legislative houses include issues per-
taining to feeding tube refusals, decision-making ethics committees for nursing homes,
and requirements that doctors' "do not resuscitate" orders for terminally ill patients be
in writing. Id; cf. Missouri's High Court Bars Life Support Removal, N.Y. Times, Nov.
17, 1988, at A25, col. 1. Although Missouri's living will statute permits withdrawal of life
support systems from hopelessly ill and injured patients in a persistent vegetative state,
it specifically forbids withholding of food and water. Id.
21. 70 N.J. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663; cf. In re Joseph v. Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me.
1987); Top Maine Court Backs Right to Die, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1987, at A41, col. 1.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, in a four-to-three decision, ruled on Dec. 3, 1987
that the parents of a man who had been comatose for two years could order the termina-
tion of artificial feeding by tube. While the court based its opinion upon the constitu-
tional right to privacy, and not on the common-law right to refuse medical treatment, it
nonetheless required clear and convincing evidence as to the desires of the patient, made
before becoming comatose, to be disconnected from life-support systems in such a situa-
tion. The Quinlan precedent does not require the clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard. The Maine case represents, therefore, a hybrid rule, combining judicially required
indicia of both the substituted judgment theory and the common-law doctrine of the
right to refuse medical care. For the New York Court of Appeals's refusal to follow such
a rule see the discussion of Storar, supra note 18.
19881
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dressed was the autonomy of parental rights, which includes the right
to choose medical treatment for their children, when there is a claim
that the parents' decision is incongruous with the child's best inter-
ests.21 When these conflicts arose, the strong, countervailing state in-
terests compelled the courts to review the decision not to treat and
consider restricting the autonomy of parental rights. Secondary issues,
important to the courts' reasonings, include the effect of support of
responsible medical authority for the parents' decisions, the use of
quality-of-life considerations in the decision-making process, and the
extent of the courts' equitable authority under the doctrine of parens
patriaes.2 Tertiary issues, which are a backdrop to all cases of medi-
cally based litigation, are the interests of the physicians, hospitals and
the health care industry in protection from liability for their profes-
sional conduct. While their ethical obligation is the preservation of life
and health, there are legal duties to respect patients' wishes, obtain
consent, and respect patient/physician confidentiality. '
Ultimately, to resolve all these conflicts, the state through its court
system, is called upon to exercise its authority. The fulcrum upon
which all these interests are balanced is the best interests of the child.
Because that doctrine lacks clear rules and concrete guidelines, the
best interests of the child are decided on a case-by-case basis.25 The
following discussion demonstrates how two courts in different countries
handled such a decision in cases where the results are life and death.
The different results the courts reached reflect how the situs of the
conflict is less important than the development of a responsible inter-
national approach to the dilemma of medical decision-making for the
treatment of handicapped newborns. Indeed, the authority of the gov-
ernment to interject itself into the treatment decision-making is one of
the major issues.
22. See infra notes 113-19 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the
best interests of the child doctrine.
23. See infra notes 320-29 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the
parens patriae doctrine.
24. Smith, supra note 14, at 1175-82. For a current discussion of the medical profes-
sion's grappling with the treatment refusal issue, see Lambert, Hospital 'Bi-
ophilosophers' Help Solve Life-and-Death Issues, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1988, at B10,
col. 2. Medical professionals in England are not, incidentally, bound by the informed
consent doctrine as are their American counterparts. See Sidaway v. Bethlehem Royal
Hosp., [1985] 2 W.L.R. 480 (H.L.); Schwartz & Grubb, Why Britain Can't Afford In-
formed Consent, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 19 (1985).
25. R. HELFER, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 333 (1976).
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II. THE CASES: IN RE B. (A MINOR) & WEBER V. STONY BROOK
HOSPITAL
Only two cases involving parental refusal of consent for treatment
of handicapped newborns have reached the level of appellate review in
England and the United States.26 The courts reached opposite conclu-
sions on whether to treat based upon their reasoning as to what consti-
tuted the best interests of the child. 7 These cases, therefore, exemplify
the opposite conclusions reached in the small universe of cases con-
cerning treatment refusal for handicapped newborns. There have been
eleven such other cases, all at the trial court level only, all in the
United States, and most of which have gone unreported officially.28
26. In re B. (A Minor), [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421 (C.A. 1982); Weber v. Stony Brook
Hosp., 95 A.D. 2d 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685 (2d Dep't), aff'd per curiam, 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456
N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983).
27. [1981] 1 W.L.R. at 1423-24; 95 A.D.2d at 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 687, aff'd per
curiam, 60 N.Y.2d at 213, 456 N.E.2d at 1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
28. Of the 11 cases, only one decision, In re Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d
965 (Bx. Co. Sup. Ct. 1979), appeared in a court reporter. The infant girl was born with
spina bifida. Id. at 699-700, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 966. The court appointed a guardian to
consent to corrective surgery. Medical evidence indicated that the life of the infant was
not hopeless. Id. at 702-03, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 968. In an interview with the court-ap-
pointed guardian ad litem, Simon Rosenzweig, Esq., at his office at 122 East 42nd Street,
New York, New York on Apr. 9, 1987, Mr. Rosenzweig recalled that several physicians
who were treating the child had agreed unanimously that non-treatment was not a valid
medical alternative [hereinafter Rosenzweig Interview].
In an effort to protect the anonymity of the infants, the other ten courts sealed their
records of the cases. Thus, none of these were officially reported. Nonetheless, the events
received substantial press coverage and were also the focus of those with legal and medi-
cal interests. Authors of books and periodicals in which articles about the cases appear
relied on interviews with parents and other family members, hospital personnel, attor-
neys and judges, as well as media accounts of the trials themselves, for substantive infor-
mation about the cases. The citations below reflect those sources in which the cases are
mentioned or discussed.
The "Baby Ashley" case (unreported), discussed in 1 ISSUES IN LAW & MED. 5 (1985)
(citing the Idaho Statesman, Sept. 27, 1983, at 1.) The case involved an abandoned in-
fant afflicted with hydronencephaly. The court denied her physician's petition to discon-
tinue life-sustaining treatment. The infant died five days later.
In re Baby F, No. J928 (Cir. Ct., Coos County, Or., 1983) (unreported), noted in D.
MEYERS, MEDICO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH AND DYING § 14:10 (Dec. Supp. 1986). In
a suit brought by a right-to-life organization, the court ordered treatment of the new-
born's neural tube defect. The court then withdrew its order upon the physician's finding
that the infant's condition was hopeless but stayed the dissolution of the injunction until
the plaintiff could oppose the attorney general's motion to dismiss because the organiza-
tion did not represent the child. The infant's death mooted the case. See infra note 103
and accompanying text.
In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004 A (Monroe Co. Cir. Ct., Ind., filed Apr. 12, 1982),
appeal denied sub nom. State ex rel. Infant Doe v. Baker, Sup. Ct. No. 432S140 (filed
1988]
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May 27, 1982) (unreported, discussed in J. LYON, supra note 3, at 21-39; D. MEYERS,
supra, § 14:12.1.), cert. denied sub nom. Infant Doe v. Bloomington, 464 U.S. 961 (1983).
This is the well-known "Baby Doe" case. The parents of this infant, born with spina
bifida and hydrocephalus, chose nontreatment among the options presented to them by
the infant's physician. Another physician vehemently opposed the parents' decision and
instigated the district attorney to bring suit on the matter. The trial court, through suc-
cessive proceedings, upheld the parents' right to decide the course of their child's treat-
ment. The intermediate appellate court and high state court refused to hear the case.
While the district attorney was en route to argue for certiorari before the United States
Supreme Court, the infant died.
In re Jeff & Scott Mueller, Nos. 81J300 & 81J301 (5th Jud. Cir. Ct. Vermilion Co.,
Ill. 1981) (unreported, noted in Ellis, Letting Defective Babies Die: Who Decides?, 7 AM.
J. OF L. & MED. 393, 401 n.32 (1981); J. LYON, supra note 3, at 190-92; Robertson, Di-
lemma in Danville, 11 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 5 (1981); Shatten & Chabon, Decision-
Making and the Right to Refuse Lifesaving Treatment for Defective Newborns, 3 J.
LEGAL MED. 59, 65 n.30 (1982) [hereinafter Shatten]; R. WEIR, SELECTIVE NON-TREAT-
MENT OF HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS: MORAL DILEMMAS IN NEONATAL MEDICINE 97-99
(1984)). This case involved Siamese twins joined at the waist. The parents chose non-
treatment, which included refusing to feed the newborns. The court removed the infants
from the parents' custody, but found no neglect on their part, within the statutory mean-
ing. Subsequently, when the infants' condition stabilized, the court ordered surgical
separation.
In re Elin Daniels, No. 81-15577FJ01 (Dade Co. Cir. Ct., Fla., filed June 23, 1981)
(unreported, noted in Portella, The Elin Daniels Case: An Examination of the Legal,
Medical, and Ethical Considerations Posed when Persons and Doctors Disagree on
Whether to Treat a Defective Newborn, 18 THE FORUM 709 (1982-83); Mnookin, Two
Puzzles, 1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 667, 670 n.10; Shatten, supra, at 65 n.32; R. WEIR, supra, at
97-98.) The court ordered treatment for this infant born with spina bifida cystica and
hydrocephalus.
In re McNulty, No. 1960 (Prob. Ct., Essex Co., Mass., filed Feb. 15, 1978) (unre-
ported, discussed in Brant & McNulty, Treating Defective Newborns, The Ethical Di-
lemma, 10 HUM. RTS. 35, 36 (1982); Note, Legal and Ethical Issues Concerning Treat-
ment of Seriously Ill Newborns, 30 LoY. L. REV. 925, 932 (1984). This infant, afflicted
with congenital rubella, suffered from heart defects, respiratory abnormalities, and a host
of other birth defects. The court ordered treatment.
A Detroit, Michigan juvenile court, relying on a Michigan child abuse statute, or-
dered surgery on a mongoloid newborn with duodenal atresia (unreported, noted in
Brown & Truitt, Euthanasia and the Right to Die, 30 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 615, 632 nn.114-
15 (1976)). The parents consented to treatment of the infant under a threat that the
infant would be removed from their custody.
In re Teague, No. 104-212-81886 (Cir. Ct., Baltimore, Md., filed Dec. 4, 1974) (unre-
ported, noted in Mnookin, supra, at 670 n.10.) The death of this infant, born with spina
bifida, vacated the court proceedings.
Maine Medical Center v. Houle, No. 74-145 (Super. Ct. Cumberland Co., Me., filed
Feb. 14, 1974) (unreported, reprinted in 1 ISSUES IN LAW & MED. 237 (1986); Mnookin,
supra, at 670 n.10; R. WEIR, supra, at 93). This newborn suffered from a variety of mala-
dies, the most crucial of which was a trachaelesophageal fistula. This condition causes
two problems. First, it allows gastric juices to enter the lungs. Second, the esophagus is
blocked, making eating impossible. The child died a day after court-ordered surgery took
place. R. WEIR, supra, at 94.
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In re Obernauer (N.J. Juv. Dom. Rel. Ct., Morris Co., filed Dec. 22, 1970) (unre-
ported, noted in Note, Birth Defective Infants: A Standard for Nontreatment, 30 STAN.
L. REv. 599, 601 n.13 (1978); Shatten, supra, at 65 n.30). The court ordered treatment for
this infant, born with Down's syndrome and intestinal blockage.
This Note is specifically concerned with civil proceedings in which courts have de-
termined whether parents may refuse consent for treatment of handicapped newborns,
and, if not, whether the court will order such treatment. Whenever death is an issue,
however, there are criminal concerns as well. Three cases, one in England and two in the
United States, serve to illustrate that juries, judges and prosecutors shy away from crimi-
nal prosecutions and convictions of parents and physicians whose conduct results in the
death of handicapped newborns. These cases are as follows:
People v. Mueller, No. 81-CF204 (5th Jud. Cir. Ct., Vermilion Co., Ill. 1981) (unre-
ported, discussed in Robertson, supra, at 5; J. LYON, supra, note 3 at 190-92; R. WEIR,
supra, at 95-97; Note, Withholding Treatment From Defective Infants: Infant Doe:
Postmortem, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 224 (1983) [hereinafter Withholding Treatment
From Infants]; Shatten, supra, at 65 n.30; Ellis, supra, at 401 n.32). Criminal charges
were filed against the parents and attending physician for conspiracy to commit murder
and endangering the life of the child. Robertson, supra, at 5; J. LYON, supra note 3, at
190. At a preliminary hearing the court ruled there was no probable cause and dismissed
the charges. Robertson, supra, at 5; J. LYON, supra note 3, at 191. Later, the district
attorney sought a grand jury indictment against the parents for attempted murder, con-
spiracy to commit murder, and solicitation to murder, and against the physician for con-
spiracy to commit murder. Withholding Treatment From Infants, supra, at 232. The
grand jury did not indict. Id. The district attorney asserted afterwards that he was not
interested in putting the Muellers in prison, but "only wanted to establish that they had
done wrong." J. LYON, supra note 3, at 192.
In England, Regina v. Arthur involved the death of a Down's syndrome baby
(Leichester Crown Ct. 1981) (unreported, discussed in Gunn & Smith, Arthur's Case
and the Right to Life of a Down's Syndrome Child, 1985 CRIM. L. REv. 705; Editorial:
Regina v. Dr. Leonard Arthur, 50 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 3 (1982); Gerber, Child Wel-
fare-Infants Born as Mongols and with Other Defects -Liabilities of Parents and
Medical Practitioners Involved-Criminal Implications, 56 AUSTL. L. J. 139 (1982); Gal-
lagher, Parents' Rights in Respect of Their Children, 12 FAM. L. 168 (1982); J. LYON,
supra note 3, at 193). After consulting with the parents, Dr. Arthur wrote an order stat-
ing that "[p]arents do not wish child to survive. Nursing care only." Gunn & Smith,
supra, at 706. He further prescribed a narcotic to be administered to the infant "as re-
quired." Id. The infant was also to be fed "if it demanded it." Gallagher, supra, at 168.
Attempted murder charges brought against the pediatrician (the initial charge was for
murder) went to a jury trial. Gunn & Smith, supra, at 705. He was acquitted. The judge
allowed the prosecution and defense to offer conflicting evidence as to whether Dr. Ar-
thur administered the narcotic to quell the infant's hunger and thereby cause its death,
or as a pain killer to reduce the infant's suffering. Gunn & Smith, supra, at 712 n.25.
Subsequently, the judge grappled with the intent element of the charge and whether the
physician's orders, a revocable act, constituted an omission for which he could be liable.
Id. at 706-07. While the jury verdict provided a final disposition of the matter, it failed
to tell whether a jury could grasp the legal nuances involved.
In Arizona, the parents of a child born with meningitis chose non-treatment, includ-
ing the withholding of sustenance, among the options offered by the physician (unre-
ported, noted in Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal
Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 213, 217 n.27 (1975) [hereinafter Involuntary Euthanasia]).
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A. In Re B. (A Minor)
On July 28, 1981, "B." was born, afflicted with Down's syndrome, a
fatally blocked intestine and possible heart trouble.2 Surgery could
have remedied the fatal blockage, but, at the same time, might have
exacerbated the heart trouble, resulting in an equally fatal condition."0
Either way, if she lived, severe mental retardation and physical handi-
caps were inevitable." With a successful operation, the Down's syn-
drome created a life expectancy of twenty to thirty years.
32
The parents made a decision to refuse consent for the operation
because "nature had made its own arrangements to terminate a life
that would not be fruitful and nature should not be interfered with. 33
Doctors at the hospital reported the parents' decision to the local child
care authority. 4 The local authority made B. a ward of the court, peti-
tioned for her care and control and asked for an order authorizing
them to have the surgery performed. 5 The trial court granted the peti-
tion, making B. a ward of the court until the age of majority (or until
further order of the court) under the care and control of the local au-
thority.38 The court empowered the local authority to consent to sur-
gery, place B. for adoption and commence the adoption proceedings. 7
B. was moved to a different hospital where the operation was to be
performed." When the surgeon spoke to B.'s parents, however, and
learned of their objections, he declined to operate.39 The local author-
ity brought the matter back to the trial court.40 The court's inquiry
revealed that two other surgeons were in favor of the operation.4 ' At
this point, however, the trial judge, influenced by the parents' argu-
ment, rescinded the part of the order authorizing the surgery.2
That same afternoon, the local authority appealed to the Court of
The jury found that the underlying medical condition had caused the infant's death, not
the parents' or physician's conduct. Thus, no criminal prosecution resulted. Id.
29. [1981] 1 W.L.R. at 1422-23.
30. Id. at 1423.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1423-24.
34. Id. at 1422.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1422-23.
39. Id. at 1423.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1422.
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Appeal.43 The evidence that the court considered centered on the med-
ical prognosis."" Without the operation, B. would die in a matter of
days.4 With the operation, the court considered the best and worst
case scenarios."6 If the surgery exacerbated the heart trouble, B. might
survive only two or three months.47 If it did not, B. could be expected
to live the twenty or thirty years of an otherwise normal mongoloid.4
8
The Court of Appeal reversed the lower court and ordered the sur-
gery.49 The lower court was found to have erred because the trial judge
based his decision upon the parental prerogative rather than the best
interests of the child.5 0 The Court of Appeal asserted that the latter
was the singularly correct issue upon which to decide the case. 1 The
parents argued that their decision not to treat was based upon the
child's best interests, for they wished to spare her from a life of perpet-
ual medical difficulties, both mental and physical.2 The Court of Ap-
peal concluded from the evidence, however, that, because the operation
might be successful, and if so, B. might be no worse off than any other
person afflicted with Down's syndrome, surgery was in accordance with
the newborn's best interests. 3
B. Weber v. Stony Brook Hospital
The Weber case involved another little girl, protected in anonym-
ity as Baby Jane Doe."' She was born on October 11, 1983 with a com-
bination of birth defects including spina bifida, microcephaly and
hydrocephalus.5 5 At first, the parents decided to have their newborn
treated surgically, and she was taken to the defendant hospital for that
purpose.5 6 Subsequently, however, after consulting with medical per-
sonnel, clergy, a social worker and family members, the parents de-
cided to forego surgery and opted instead for a medically conservative
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1423.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1424.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1423-24.
52. Id. at 1423.
53. Id. at 1424.
54. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685 (2d Dep't), aff'd
per curiam, 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983).
55. Id. at 588, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
56. Id; see also J. LYON, supra note 3, at 46.
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course of treatment.57 Rather than surgery, the plan was to treat the
infant with antibiotics, a regimented diet and hygienic care.58 Someone
on the hospital staff, however, disagreed with that decision and con-
tacted a right-to-life attorney in Vermont by the name of A. Lawrence
Washburn.5 9 Washburn filed suit in New York State Supreme Court,
Suffolk County, petitioning the court for an order to compel the
surgery.60
The trial court heard evidence for two days, most of which con-
cerned the infant's prognosis.6' Two physicians, a pediatric neurologist
and a neurosurgeon, testified in this regard.6" Without surgery, Baby
Jane Doe would live less than two years.63 With surgery, she might live
twenty years."" Although there was some conflict between the physi-
cians as to the minutiae of the prognosis with surgery, they agreed that
severe mental and physical handicaps were certain. 65 The neurosur-
geon, who took a relatively optimistic prognostic view, testified as to
whether the parents' decision not to consent to surgery was "medically
reasonable and acceptable." 6 He responded, "Yes sir, it is."'6 7
The parents' attorney asserted to the court that the parents' deci-
sion was made with full concern for their newborn daughter's welfare,
and was based upon the "best medical advice available to them."6
William E. Weber, the court-appointed guardian ad litem, made a clos-
ing argument of a single statement: "Judge, if you're going to make a
mistake in this case, make it on the side of life; that's all I ask."6 9 The
trial judge ruled in favor of the surgery and authorized the guardian ad
litem to consent thereto on behalf of the infant.70 The basis for his
decision was that Baby Jane Doe was "'in need of immediate surgical
procedures to preserve her life.' ",71
The parents entered an appeal with the Appellate Division of the
57. 95 A.D.2d at 588, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
58. J. LYON, supra note 3, at 46.
59. Id.
60. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 588, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686 (2d
Dep't), aff'd per curiam, 60 N.Y.2d 208, 452 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983); see
also J. LYON, supra note 3, at 46.
61. J. LYON, supra note 3, at 47.
62. Id. at 47-48.
63. Id. at 47.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 47-48.
66. Id. at 48.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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New York State Supreme Court, Second Department, that same day."'
Before midnight, the three-judge appellate panel stayed the trial
judge's order." The next day, following a hearing, the Appellate Divi-
sion reversed the lower court's decision and dismissed the petition. "
Upon review, the court found that the parents' decision was in the best
interests of the child.75 Although the doctors testified that Baby Jane
Doe would certainly die within two years without surgery7 6 the court
said "this is not a case where an infant is being deprived of medical
treatment to achieve a quick and supposedly merciful death."'7 7 The
court deemed the parents' decision to be "informed, intelligent, and
reasonable . . . based upon and supported by responsible medical au-
thority.""8 Putting it plainly, the court saw the situation as one "where
the parents have chosen one course of appropriate medical treatment
over another. 7
9
Now, it was the guardian ad litem's turn to appeal, this time to
the highest court in the State of New York, the Court of Appeals. One
week after the Appellate Division decision, the Court of Appeals af-
firmed the intermediate court's dismissal of the petition.80 The Court
of Appeals did not, however, reach the merits of the case as the Appel-
late Division had done. Rather, the dismissal was upheld on procedural
grounds, citing Washburn's failure to follow statutorily prescribed pro-
cedures which are necessary to petition the court for judicial authoriza-
tion to override a parental decision.8"
The Court of Appeals firmly asserted that only legal means for
intervention between parent and child was a "child neglect proceed-
ing."8 2 Through the Family Court Act, specifically Article 10, the state
legislature recognizes that the "primary responsibility . . . concerning
the choice of medical care for [a] child" lies with the parents.83 There-
72. The Second Department of the Appellate Division of the New York State Su-
preme Court has jurisdiction over appeals from the Supreme Courts of the counties of
Kings, Richmond, Dutchess, Orange, Putnam, Rockland, Westchester, Nassau, Suffolk
and Queens. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 70 (McKinney 1983); see also N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
73. J. LYON, supra note 3, at 49.
74. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, 687 (2d
Dep't), aff'd per curiam, 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1183, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983).
75. Id.
76. See J. LYON, supra note 3, at 47.
77. 95 A.D.2d at 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 213, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1188, 469
N.Y.S.2d 63, 65 (1983).
81. Id. at 211, 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
82. Id. at 212, 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
83. Id. at 211, 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
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fore, the legislature created "explicit provision for those instances call-
ing for governmental intervention." 8 The statute itself states that the
Act is expressly:
[D]esigned to establish procedures to help protect children
from injury or mistreatment and to help safeguard their physi-
cal, mental, and emotional well-being. It is designed to provide
a due process of law for determining when the state, through
its family court, may intervene against the wishes of parent on
behalf of a child so that his needs are properly met. 9
A child neglect proceeding may be originated only by a child protective
agency or "a person on the court's direction."86 A child protective
agency "may file a petition whenever in [its] view court proceedings
are warranted. All other persons and entities may only file a petition if
directed to do so by the court."8 7
The Court of Appeals steadfastly recognized and enforced the
"[l]egislature's concern that judicial proceedings touching the family
relationship should not be casually initiated and impose upon the
courts the obligation to exercise sound discretion before permitting
such petitions to be filed." '88
The Court of Appeals opinion delivered scathing criticism towards
Washburn for failing to contact the appropriate child protective
agency. 89 The court displayed great disdain towards the argument
which would allow "any person . .. to institute judicial proceedings
which would catapult him into the very heart of a family circle, there
to challenge the most private and most precious responsibility vested
in the parents for the care and nurture of their children . . .-.
The Court of Appeals was nearly as critical of the trial court for its
failure in this regard as well:
We do not attempt to anticipate or set forth all the circum-
stances in which a court may be called upon to protect a child's
interests. Nor do we mean to define the extent of the court's
obligation to conduct an independent investigation or to con-
sult with a child protective agency. There may be occasions
when it is appropriate for the court to act without making fur-
84. Id. at 211, 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
85. Id. at 211-12, 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64 (quoting N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 1011 (McKinney 1983)).
86. 60 N.Y.2d at 212, 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
87. Id., 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
88. Id., 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
89. Id. at 212-13, 456 N.E.2d at 1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
90. Id. at 213, 456 N.E.2d at 1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
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ther inquiry of this nature. On this record, however, no such
circumstances are evident."'
In closing its unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals
left no question as to its attitude towards the case:
There are overtones to this proceeding which we find distres-
sing. Confronted with the anguish of the birth of a child with
severe physical disorders, these parents, in consequence of ju-
dicial procedures for which there is no precedent or authority,
have been subjected in the last two weeks to litigation through
all three levels of our State's court system. We find no justifica-
tion for resort to or entertainment of these proceedings.
92
To best understand the significance of Weber, one should recog-
nize that the Court of Appeals showed tacit approval of the Appellate
Division's treatment of the substantive issues by affirming its decision
without criticism.9 3 The United States District Court, Eastern District
of New York, made that very point in its opinion for the federal case
which arose from the Weber matter." The District Court opined that
"[t]he Court of Appeals left undisturbed, and indeed apparently en-
dorsed, the determination by the Appellate Division that the parents
of Baby Jane Doe had acted reasonably and with the best interests of
the child in mind."' 5
While the Appellate Division based its decision upon two express
grounds-the parental presumption and the support of responsible
medical authority, 96 the Court of Appeals considered only the former
in the context of the statutory protection of family privacy. 7 Having
reviewed the record of the case, however, the higher court did state
that the circumstances did not warrant investigation by either the trial
91. Id., 456 N.E.2d at 1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
92. Id., 456 N.E.2d at 1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
93. United States v. Univ. Hosp., State Univ. of New York at Stony Brook, 575 F.
Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984). The United States Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services ("DHHS") brought suit to compel the hospital to
turn over its records on Baby Jane Doe, pursuant to the DHHS's highly controversial
promulgations under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C § 794 (Supp. 1981).
The court ruled in favor of the hospital. The United States Supreme Court reviewed this
case in its determination of Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986), stating
that "the judgment here thus rests entirely on the reasoning of [the Second Circuit in]
University Hospital." Id. at 620.
94. 575 F. Supp. at 610.
95. Id. at 610-11 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
96. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686 (2d
Dep't), aff'd per curiam, 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983).
97. 60 N.Y.2d at 213, 456 N.E.2d at 1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
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court or the child protective agency to protect the child's interests."8
Furthermore, even though the Court of Appeals's opinion concurred
that trial courts have the parens patriae authority to render a decision
without making a further inquiry, the facts of this case did not call for
an order to consent to surgery.9 9
C. Other Cases
The universe of other cases involving challenges over consent for
treatment of handicapped newborns totals eleven, all on the trial level
of various state courts in the United States. 00 Of these, eight resulted
in orders to treat,101 one resulted in an order upholding the parents'
decision not to treat,102 and two were mooted by the infants' deaths
before the courts could render final decisions.108 One of the orders to
treat was mooted by the infant's death before treatment began. 04 The
facts in some cases distinguish them from the topic cases. In In re Cic-
ero, 0 5 a New York State Supreme Court case, there was no conflict
among the medical opinions.'"' The doctors unanimously agreed that
treatment was in order.1 0 The court agreed.'0 8 The infant in the "Baby
Ashley" case, heard in Idaho, was an abandoned newborn, so, obviously
parents were not involved.' 0" A physician treating the infant petitioned
for the removal of artificial life-support systems.110 Thus, there was no
issue as to conflicts between the rights of parent and child. The court
denied the petition. "
98. Id. at 213, 456 N.E.2d at 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
99. Id. at 213, 456 N.E.2d at 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
100. See supra note 28 for a narrative description of these cases.
101. The "Baby Ashley" case, discussed in 1 IssuEs IN LAW & MED. 5 (1985) supra
note 28; the Detroit, Michigan Case, noted in Brown & Truitt, supra note 28; In re Jeff
& Scott Mueller, noted in Ellis, supra note 28; In re Elin Daniels, noted in Portella,
supra note 28; In re Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979); In
re McNulty, discussed in Brant & McNulty, supra note 28; Maine Medical Center v.
Houle, No. 74-145 (Me. Super. Ct., filed Feb. 14, 1974), reprinted in 1 ISSUES IN LAW &
MED. 237 (1986); In re Obernauer, noted in Note, supra note 28.
102. In re Infant Doe, discussed in J. LYON, supra note 3, at 21-39.
103. In re Baby F, No. J928 (Cir. Ct., Coos County, Or., 1983); In re Teague, No. 104-
212-81886 (Cir. Ct., Baltimore, Md., filed Dec. 4, 1974).
104. Maine Medical Center v. Houle.
105. 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
106. Rosenzweig Interview, supra note 28.
107. Id.
108. In re Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 701-02, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965, 967-68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1979).
109. The "Baby Ashley" case, discussed in 1 IssuEs IN LAW & MED. 5 (1985).
110. Id.
111. Id.
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Nevertheless, even without counting the distinguishable cases,
England's Court of Appeal's B. decision, from a categorical perspective,
represents the majority view, while the New York Court of Appeals's
Weber decision represents the minority view.
III. THE ISSUES
As usual with litigation where a minor's rights or welfare is in-
volved, the B. and Weber cases turned on the determination of "the
best interests of the child."1 1
The best interests of the child doctrine requires that where a
child's welfare is at stake, the court must resolve all conflicts solely on
considerations of what will benefit the child. 13 The doctrine originated
in English common law, but its roots are historically vague. 1 4 At early
common law, parents had absolute rights of control over their chil-
112. In re B. (A Minor), [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421, 1422 (C.A. 1982); Weber v. Stony
Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, 687 (2d Dep't), afj'd per curiam, 60
N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983).
113. See, e.g., Finlay v Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925). When a non-resi-
dent of New York sued his estranged wife for custody of their children, and the custody
suit was not incident to a suit for divorce or separation, Justice Cardozo wrote that the
court, in equity, "does not concern itself with such disputes in their relation to the dis-
putants." Id. at 433-34, 148 N.E. at 626. Instead, the court
acts as parens patriae to do what is best for the interest of the child. [The
judge] is to put himself in the position of a "wise, affectionate and careful par-
ent," and make provision for the child accordingly.... He is not adjudicating a
controversy between adversary parties [i.e., the parents], to compose their pri-
vate differences.
Id. at 433-34, 148 N.E. at 626 (quoting Queen v. Gyngall, [1983] 2 Q.B. 232, 238) (empha-
sis added); see also Annotation, Action Between Parents for the Sole Purpose of Deter-
mining Custody of Child as a Proper Remedy, 40 A.L.R. 940 (1926). Parens patriae is
defined infra notes 322-24 and accompanying text.
114. R. Helfer, supra note 25, at 325-26; accord, Re D. (A Minor), [1988] 2 W.L.R.
398 (C.A.) (the English rule was evolved against a historical background of conflict be-
tween parents over the upbringing of their children).
Although the doctrine is universally accepted and employed in the Anglo-American
system of jurisprudence, it has never been concretely defined, nor have guidelines as to
what the child's best interests consist of ever been established. Id. Nevertheless, the doc-
trine is applied as the standard for legislative enactments and judicial resolution in mat-
ters involving child custody, abuse, neglect and generally, matters involving children's
rights. For applications of the doctrine in divorce cases, see Banta, Divorce-The Wel-
fare and Best Interest of the Child, 5 WILLIAMmrE L. J. 82 (1968). From a review of the
applications of the doctrine, one may deduce that it behooves the court to offer a thor-
ough and clear reasoning as to why the child's best interests are served by the decision of
the court. Accordingly, some commentators assert that the court should not consider
factors external to the individual child, such as those pertaining to parents, economic
elements, or religion. Smith, supra note 14, at 1125.
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dren. "' With the advent of the doctrine of parens patriae, however,
that right became limited by the state's role thereunder. " 6 The best
interests of the child concept developed as the fulcrum upon which to
balance the parental rights with the state's interests.117 English and
American legislatures and courts have wholly embraced the doctrine. " 8
As previously mentioned, the topic cases did not include many is-
sues usually raised in cases where there is a conflict over the refusal of
medical treatment where death would result.11 9 The issues argued in
these cases are: parental rights, particularly the presumption that par-
ents act in their child's best interests; 20 whether the support of re-
sponsible medical authority is sufficient grounds upon which the court
will find that the parents so acted;' and, whether quality-of-life con-
siderations are valid criteria to include in the decision-making pro-
cess.'22 Other issues which the courts addressed, directly or indirectly,
were the extent of the authority of the court in the exercise of its equi-
table powers of parens patriae and the attendant issue of custody
when the court considers removal of the child from the parents.23
A. Presumption That Parents Act in the Child's Best Interests
One of the most powerful notions in our modern jurisprudence is
the autonomy of the family unit. Parents are presumed to act in their
child's best interests.'2 ' The presumption is grounded in long estab-
lished principles of common law.'2 ' The most authoritative legal com-
mentators on both sides of the Atlantic have asserted that the natural
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their chil-
dren. 26 Accordingly, this notion has received legislative and judicial
115. N. WEINSTEIN, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 2 (1973).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. In England, see Children and Young Persons Act, 1969, ch. 54; Re D. (A Minor),
[19881 2 W.L.R. 398, 414 (C.A.). In the United States, see N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. §§ 1011-
1074 (McKinney 1983); Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925); Halstead v.
Halstead, 259 Iowa 526, 532, 144 N.W.2d 861, 864 (1966) (the child oriented best interest
concept is neither new, novel nor uncommon in the field of jurisprudence.).
119. See supra notes 8-23 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 124-200 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 201-91 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 292-319 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 320-29 and accompanying text.
124. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1978) (the leading case on the issue of paren-
tal autonomy in conflict with their children's rights).
125. Id. at 601.
126. Id. (quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 447; 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 190).
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support in both countries.
Statutory provisions in both England and New York, contained re-
spectively in The Children and Young Persons Act (1969) and The
Family Court Act, serve to protect the parent-child relationship from
unwarranted intrusion."2 7 Both statutes set forth clearly delineated
rules for who may initiate proceedings, the grounds upon which they
may be initiated and the specific roles of the child protective agencies
and courts. 128
In England, those authorized to initiate proceedings are the local
child protection authority (local authority), constable, or other person
authorized by an order of the Secretary of State.' No other person
may bring a proceeding unless he gives notice thereof to the local au-
thority.8 The local authority must conduct inquiries unless it decides
they are not necessary.' If an inquiry is made, a proceeding must be
brought.3" The court can summons the attendance of the infant and
has discretion to give the parents an opportunity to be heard.' The
statute authorizes the court to act if it determines that the infant has
suffered, inter alia, neglect of health or development.'3 " The remedies
available to the court range from a complete severing of the parent-
child relationship, which includes removing the child from the parents'
custody and making the child a ward of the court, to ordering supervi-
sion of the parents by the local authority when the child remains in the
parents' care. 35
New York's Family Court Act is nearly identical in substance. 3 6 It
is expressly "designed to provide a due process of law for determining
when the state, through its family court, may intervene against the
wishes of a parent on behalf of a child so that his needs are properly
met."'3 7 Only the state may initiate proceedings, through the child pro-
tective agency or "a person on the court's direction."'3 s The agency
127. Children and Young Persons Act, 1969, ch. 54; N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT (McKinney
1983).
128. Children and Young Persons Act, 1969, ch. 54, §§ 1, 2; N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§
1011-1074 (McKinney 1983).
129. Children and Young Persons Act 1969, ch. 54, § 1.
130. Id. §§ 2, 3.
131. Id. § 2(l).
132. Id. § 2(2).
133. Id. §§ 2(4),(5).
134. Id. § 1(2).
135. Id. § 1(3).
136. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT §§ 1011-1074 (McKinney 1983).
137. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 212, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1187, 469
N.Y.S.2d 63, 64 (1983).
138. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 1032 (McKinney 1983).
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may file a petition for proceedings at its own complete discretion. 13 9
For any other person or entity, a petition may be filed only if the court
so directs.1 4 0 When a matter is presented to the court in the latter fash-
ion, the court can order an agency investigation. 1 ' Thereafter, the
agency must report its findings to the court, which will then determine
whether a proceeding is in order.' 2 Thus, although the court may en-
tertain and decide proceedings without the agency's participation, the
New York legislature clearly intended for the agency to play a "signifi-
cant role" therein.'
4 3
Judicial recognition of the parental presumption is reflected in a
great many opinions from a wide variety of courts and cases in both
England and the United States. For example, in a recent English case,
Re K.D. (A Minor)'4 4 Lord Templeton of the House of Lords set forth
the doctrine in a most concise manner. 4 6 The case involved termina-
tion of access for an unwed mother who had virtually refused to raise
her child, placing him in long-term foster care. 46 After stating that
"English common-law and statute require" that the child's welfare
must be "the first and paramount consideration," the court asserted
the general rule that "[t] he best person to bring up a child is the natu-
ral parent .... Public authorities cannot improve on nature.'
' 47
The only limitation upon the parental presumption is when the
court finds that the child is neglected or abused. 48 The court also cited
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.149 The Convention, to which the United King-
dom is a party, contains provisions which protect the family unit from
governmental intervention.'"0 The court pointed out that the juxtapo-
sition of the English common-law rule and the Convention rule sup-
ported the principle of the parental presumption. 5'
While the House of Lords recognized the vast power that Parlia-
139. 60 N.Y.2d at 212, 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
140. Id., 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
141. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1034 (McKinney 1983).
142. Id.
143. 60 N.Y.2d at 212, 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
144. [1988] 2 W.L.R. 398 (C.A.).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. (citing The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, T.I.A.S. No. 71, 1953, CMND. No. 8969 [hereinafter
Convention]).
150. Convention, supra note 149, art. 8.
151. [1988] 2 W.L.R. at 398.
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ment had given the local authorities over minors within their jurisdic-
tions, it cautioned that the powers "should be exercised not only with
responsibility but with . . . sensitivity.""' 2 The court's caveat was
prompted by the infrequency of judicial review of the local authorities'
activities.153
A case heard in the Family Division of England's High Court of
Justice, Re D. (A Minor) ,'5 resulted in an opinion which reflects ad-
herence to the parental presumption in English law.15 5 The case in-
volved a mother and daughter, where the daughter was eleven years
old and severely retarded. 15 6 The mother wished to have her daughter
sterilized for two reasons. First, she feared that her daughter's retarda-
tion stemmed from genetic defects which could be passed along to sub-
sequent generations. 57 Second, she felt the young girl would never be
capable of raising a child which might be conceived intentionally, acci-
dentally or by force. " She felt her daughter might someday marry,
and if so, should not risk these consequences. 5
The D. court also wrestled with conflicting interests and rights of
parent and child, as well as the state's parens patriae role. The court
held that the sterilization procedure could not be performed. 6 ' None-
theless, the court recited great deference to the parental presumption
as it stood challenged by the other interests. The court stated that
"[t]hough in wardship proceedings parents' rights can be suspended,
the court will not do so lightly, and only in pursuance of well-known
principles laid down over the years."'' While clearly identifying the
child's best interests as the controlling element of the case, the court
asserted that parents are presumed to act in accordance therewith. 62
As to its own role, the court deferred to the mother by stating that its
"jurisdiction in wardship is very wide, but there are limitations ... to
be exercised carefully and within limits.' 63 Ultimately, the court con-
cluded on the facts that "D." had, by age eleven, improved in her
mental and social development enough so that the mother's fears
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Re D. (A Minor), [1976] 1 All E.R. 326 (Farn. 1975).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 326.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 335.
161. Id. at 333.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 332.
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might prove groundless."8 4 Furthermore, in the case of accidental preg-
nancy or rape, the court's opinion was that abortion was preferable to
sterilization, which would run counter to D.'s right to reproduce. " Fi-
nally, the court felt that without medical evidence that D.'s retardation
stemmed from genetic defects, that reason was insufficient to sterilize
the young girl. ' Having determined that the mother had made a
faulty decision based upon invalid premises, the court succinctly as-
serted that "the judge must act as a wise parent would act." 6"
In the United States, the Supreme Court, setting forth a well-de-
veloped concept of the parental presumption in the case of Parham v.
J.R., 16 stated that "[o]ur jurisprudence historically has reflected West-
ern civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental
authority over minor children."'6 9 The plaintiffs in this case, minor
children, challenged the Georgia mental health laws which permitted
parents or guardians to consent for children to be voluntarily admitted
to a mental hospital.17 0 A three-judge panel for the United States Dis-
trict Court, Middle District of Georgia, had held the state statutes un-
constitutional for violation of due process.' 71 Chief Justice Burger
wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court, holding that the
statute was constitutional but qualified by the great risk inherent in
potential erroneous parental decisions as to evaluations of the chil-
dren's mental conditions. 72 The Court directed the state to provide
inquiries by a "neutral factfinder" (such as a staff physician)1 7 3 to de-
cide if the statutory requirements for the child's admission have been
met. 74 Nonetheless, the Court refused to subordinate the "parents'
traditional interests in and responsibility for the upbringing of their
child" by requiring a formal adversarial hearing before admission. 17 5 At
this point, the opinion recited the litany of constitutional case prece-
dents upholding the parental presumption, including Pierce v. Society
of Sisters,'16 Wisconsin v. Yoder,17 Prince v. Massachusetts,7's and
164. Id. at 335.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 333.
168. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
169. Id. at 602.
170. Id. at 588.
171. J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 139 (1976).
172. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 384, 602 (1978).
173. Id. at 606-07.
174. Id. at 604.
175. Id. at 602.
176. 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
177. 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972).
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Meyer v. Nebraska.17 9 Regarding medical care or treatment, the
Parham Court stated that "parents can and must make [these) judg-
ments." 180 The court record revealed that of the class of plaintiffs su-
ing, which numbered between 140 and 200 children being treated or
diagnosed daily at Georgia facilities, "there is no finding ... of even a
single instance of bad faith by any parent of any member. . . .'"' The
Court distinguished the case at bar from the aforementioned prece-
dents only insofar as the statute required an independent evaluation of
each voluntary admission by each hospital's superintendent."'2
The rule of law regarding the respective rights and prerogatives of
the children and parents in Parham was set forth as follows: "[Wle
conclude that our precedents permit the parents to retain a substan-
tial, if not the dominant, role in the decision, absent a finding of neg-
lect or abuse, and that the traditional presumption that the parents act
in the best interests of their child should apply," 88 albeit subject to
the state's role as parens patriae. The results of the-case turned on the
goal of the Court to find a process to protect "adequately the child's
constitutional rights by reducing risks of error without unduly trench-
ing on traditional parental authority . . . .""' By requiring state in-
volvement to the extent of including a "neutral factfinder" in the deci-
sion-making process, the Court said "[w]e do no more than emphasize
that the decision should represent an independent judgment of what
the child requires and that all sources of information that are tradi-
tionally relied on by physicians and behavioral specialists should be
consulted."18 5 In rejecting the plaintiffs' argument for formal pre-ad-
mission hearings, the Court emphasized "the danger it poses for signifi-
cant intrusion into the parent-child relationship. Pitting the parents
and child as adversaries often will be at odds with the presumption
that parents act in the best interests of their child."18
The Court went so far as to assert the validity of parental care
over that of the state as parens patriae.1 87 In discussing the legal pre-
sumptions that both the state and the parents will protect the child's
welfare, the Court noted that while natural affections guide the par-
178. 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
179. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
180. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1978).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 604.
183. Id.
184. ld. at 606.
185. Id. at 608.
186. Id. at 610.
187. Id. at 618.
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ents, the state's presumption stems from a specific statute.'
Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, offered a constitutional
basis for the parental presumption by stating: "For centuries it has
been a canon of the common law that parents speak for their minor
children. So deeply imbedded in our traditions is this principle of law
that the Constitution itself may compel a state to respect it.'
189
The Parham case represents an ever more frequently occurring
contest in the law - that which pits the rights of family autonomy and
parental prerogative against those of the child as an individual. The
Parham Court emphatically reinforced a fundamental notion upon
which much law is made: that the parents are presumed to act in their
child's best interests.
One month after the Parham decision, the New York State Court
of Appeals decided In re Joseph Hofbauer. 90 Joseph was an eight year
old suffering from Hodgkin's disease. 1 ' His parents had him under the
care of a physician who used metabolic therapy treatment for the dis-
ease.'9 The Commissioner of Social Services of Saratoga County,
where Joseph and his family resided, petitioned the Family Court, pur-
suant to Article 10 of the Family Court Act, alleging that Joseph's par-
ents had neglected him in failing to follow the medical advice of one
doctor rather than another."'3 The other, more conventional treatment,
included radiation and chemotherapy. 4 The trial court, ruling in favor
of the parents, "found that Joseph was not a neglected child within the
meaning of section 1012 of the Family Court Act . . . . "' Both the
Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals affirmed unanimously. 96
In Hofbauer, the court clearly asserted the parental presumption
by stating that "[i]t surely cannot be disputed that every parent has
188. Id.
189. Id. at 621 (footnote omitted) (Stewart, J., concurring). He further stated:
To be sure, the presumption that a parent is acting in the best interests of his
child must be a rebuttable one, since certainly not all parents are actuated by
the unselfish motive the law presumes. Some parents are simply unfit parents.
But Georgia clearly provides that an unfit parent can be stripped of his parental
authority under laws dealing with neglect and abuse of children.
Id. at 624 (footnote omitted).
190. 47 N.Y.2d 648, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1979), aff'g 65 A.D.2d 108,
411 N.Y.S.2d 416 (3d Dep't 1978).
191. 47 N.Y.2d at 652, 393 N.E.2d at 1011, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 938.
192. Id. at 652, 393 N.E.2d at 1011, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 938. The metabolic treatment
included nutritional therapy and injections of laetrile. Id.
193. Id. at 652-53, 393 N.E.2d at 1012, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 938.
194. Id. at 653, 393 N.E.2d at 1012, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
195. Id. at 654, 393 N.E.2d at 1012, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
196. Id., 393 N.E.2d at 1012-13, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
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the fundamental right to rear its child. ' 197 The predictable qualifica-
tion followed, that when the parents fail in their duty towards their
child the state will intervene.19 Nonetheless, and equally predictable,
the court further qualified that "great deference must be accorded a
parent's choice as to the mode of medical treatment to be undertaken
and the physician selected to administer the same. ... 'The filial bond
is one of the strongest, yet most delicate, and most inviolable of all
relationships.' " 99 Since the record "disclose[d] that Joseph's mother
and father were concerned and loving parents who sought qualified
medical assistance for their child," the court upheld the parents' right
to choose which medical treatment Joseph should receive. 00
Thus, the paramount issue of contest in B. and Weber, i.e. the
conflict between rights of parental authority and the child's rights as
an individual, must be viewed from the perspective which accounts for
the parental presumption. Both jurisdictions, England and New York,
protect the family unit autonomy by clear directives which prevent of-
ficious intervention. The courts rigorously enforce the legislative direc-
tive and are prone to state their deference to the parental presump-
tion. In the opinions reviewed supra, and many others, the courts
recite the procedural steps which the parties must take. to be in accor-
dance with the presumption of parental authority. The general rule fol-
lows that only when the court can determine on the facts, almost inva-
riably including an investigation by child protective authorities, that
the child suffers from neglect as defined by statute and the parents are
not acting in the child's best interests, will an order result to overrule
the parents' decision. Otherwise, the proceedings are usually dismissed.
B. Support of Responsible Medical Authority
A second notion figuring prominently in cases litigating choices of
medical treatment for handicapped newborns is the support of respon-
sible medical authority.01 It has validity as a doctrine of presumption
itself while also providing support to the parental presumption when
medical treatment choices are at issue.
Traditionally, the law reposes substantial confidence in the physi-
197. Id. at 655, 393 N.E.2d at 1013, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 940 (citations omitted).
198. Id.
199. Id. (quoting Corey L. v. Martin L., 45 N.Y.2d 383, 392, 380 N.E.2d 266, 271, 408
N.Y.S.2d 439, 443 (1978) (emphasis added)).
200. In re Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 656, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 1014, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936,
941 (1979), aff'g 65 A.D.2d 108, 411 N.Y.S.2d 416 (3d Dep't 1978) (footnote omitted).
201. See, e.g., In re B. (A Minor), [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421 (C.A. 1982); Weber v. Stony
Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685 (2d Dep't), aff'd per curiam, 60 N.Y.2d
208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983).
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cian's role in the choice of treatment decision-making process. A wide
variety of statutes in England and the United States require physi-
cians' participation in the procedural aspects of laws which pertain to
the health of citizens. Some English statutes which evince the pre-
sumption in favor of support of responsible medical authority are the
Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 202 and the Abortion Act 1967.203 In
the United States, examples of the same are the New York Mental Hy-
giene Law,2"4 the New York Public Health Law,20 5 the Mississippi Pub-
lic Health Act,20 6 and the Rhode Island Mental Health Law.
20 7
Whenever the demands of the legal system include medical mat-
ters, the state calls upon the physicians it has duly licensed. The pre-
sumption in favor of the support of responsible medical authority may
be said to derive from the state's authority to issue and regulate medi-
cal professional licensing.20 8 Once the state has determined that a med-
ical professional is qualified, it presumes that his medical judgment
may be relied upon.
The state uses medical professionals as well to assure that the
state's parens patriae power operates in the child's best interests. In
New York, there is a particularly striking example of the presumption
in favor of the support of responsible medical authority in conjunction
with the resolution of an infant's claim for personal injuries. Article 12
of the New York Civil Procedure Law and Rules(CPLR) 09 dictates in
section 1201, that, unless the court appoints a guardian ad litem, an
infant's claim or action must be brought under the representation of
the guardian of the infant's property, a parent having legal custody, or
another person having legal custody, in that order. 10 If none of the
latter representatives are available, the court must appoint a guardian
ad litem.11
In order to settle the infant's claim or action, the statute requires
202. The Infant Life (Preservation) Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, ch. 34.
203. The Abortion Act, 1967, ch. 87.
204. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.57 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1988).
205. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(4)(d) (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1989).
206. Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-21-103 (1981).
207. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5-7 (1988).
208. See generally The Medical Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, ch. 76, and The Medical Act,
1978, ch. 12 (which set the requirements in England for registration and qualification of
medical practitioners). In the United States, see N.Y. EDUCATION LAW §§ 6500-6515,
6520-6529 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1988); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 1.03 (McKinney
1985 & Supp. 1988).
209. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 1201 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1988).
210. Id.
211. Id.
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that the court conduct an infant's compromise hearing.2 " The infant's
representative must bring a motion for settlement.21 If no action has
been commenced, the representative may petition for a special pro-
ceeding in any court in which an action could have been commenced.2 14
An order issued by the court has the effect of a judgment.215
CPLR Rule 1208 sets forth the settlement procedure.216 Subsec-
tion (c) requires that the infant's attorney submit, inter alia, a medical
or hospital report in the personal injury claim.217 The court will settle
an infant's claim when, under the circumstances, such settlement is in
the infant's best interests.2 A settlement is usually in order when
there are questions as to the extent of the defendant's liability or when
the infant is not seriously injured.2 9 Accordingly, one of the court's
primary foci of the hearing is the extent of the infant's injury and re-
covery therefrom.2 2
The New York State Supreme Court has construed the require-
ment for a medical or hospital report in Rule 1208 to include an affir-
mation from a duly licensed physician as to the date of the child's last
physical examination and the extent to which the child has recovered
from his injuries.2 2"' This requirement results from the court's concern
that if the infant's claim or action is settled, the infant's right to sue
the defendant is terminated. Thus, it is the responsibility of the in-
212. Id. 1207.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. 1208 (Sections and Rules carry equal weight of authority).
217. Id.
218. Id; see Naujokas v. H. Frank Carey High School, 57 Misc. 2d 175, 292 N.Y.S.2d
196 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
219. The author, while a legal assistant at the law offices of Richard J. Cardali, 233
Broadway, New York, New York, assisted in the preparation of papers for over fifty
infant's compromises during 1986-87, and attended several of the hearings. The New
York State Supreme Courts in which the proceedings were brought included those in the
counties of Bronx, New York, Kings, Nassau, Queens, Richmond, Rockland, Suffolk and
Westchester. These courts construe the statutory sections pertaining to infant com-
promises very strictly, establishing a demanding standard that the infant's attorney must
meet in order to compromise the infant's claim. The following discussion reflects experi-
ence acquired in dealing with the standards of exactitude that these courts demanded in
these proceedings. See infra Appendix A: Rules Promulgated by the New York State
Supreme Court, Queens County, Pertaining to Infant's Compromises on file at N.Y.L.
SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [hereinafter Infant's Compromise Rules].
220. See Physician's Affirmation: Infant's Compromise: Blank Court, (Form T 359)
available from Julius Blumberg, Inc., Law Blank Publishers [hereinafter Physicians' Af-
firmation Form]. Julius Blumberg, Inc. publishes a wide variety of blank legal forms
used extensively throughout the State of New York by legal practitioners.
221. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 1208(a) (McKinney 1976).
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fant's attorney to demonstrate to the court that questions as to the
defendant's liability or relative absence of seriousness as to extent of
injury would result in a strong probability that the infant would re-
ceive a jury verdict equal to or less than the settlement offer.
The physician's affirmation provides the court with the basis upon
which to make its finding of facts regarding the extent of and recovery
from the injuries.22 2 The physician's affirmation gives rise to a rebutta-
ble presumption that the infant has, indeed, recovered from the inju-
ries. The judge will also visually examine the infant's injuries at the
hearing, and question the infant and his representatives about inju-
ries.22 If the judicial inquiries reveal information that contradicts the
contents of the physician's affirmation, the presumption of the physi-
cian's medical authority is rebutted.22
The court has the responsibility to order a settlement only when
the appropriate circumstances exist.2 2 5 This occurs only when a settle-
ment is in the child's best interests. 226 The child's best interests are
served when the offer for settlement represents the best damages re-
covery that the infant can reasonably expect to obtain.22" The physi-
cian's affirmation as to the child's medical condition is one of the
blocks of support upon which the court may render its decision.
2 2 8
Thus, the court presumes that the support of responsible medical au-
thority provides one of the bases upon which it may render a decision
regarding the child's best interests.
229
In England, judicial attention to the presumption of support of
responsible medical authority is taken in the case of C v. S, 30 which
was heard in the Queen's Bench Division. The case involved a contest
between an unwed mother and father over an abortion.23 ' The case re-
quired the court to construe the effects of the Abortion Act 1967 (Act),
and specifically, the necessity of obtaining medical certificates and the
effect thereof.23
2
Section 1 (I) of the Act requires the mother to obtain medical cer-
tification "that the continuance of her pregnancy would involve risk of
injury to her physical or mental health greater than if the pregnancy
222. Id. See, e.g., Physicians' Affirmation Form, supra note 220.
223. See generally supra note 219 and accompanying text.
224. Id.
225. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. R. 1207 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1988).
226. Id.; see supra note 219.
227. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. R. 1207, supra note 225; see supra note 219.
228. Id. See, e.g., Infant's Compromise Rules, supra note 219.
229. N.Y. CiV. PRAc. L. R. R. 1207 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1988).
230. [1987] All E.R. 1230, 1243 (Q.B.).
231. Id. at 1230.
232. Id. at 1233-34.
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were terminated."2 3 The statute requires that two physicians so cer-
tify.284 The presumption in favor of the support of responsible medical
authority for the performance of a medical procedure is obvious here.
If the termination of the pregnancy does not meet the statutory stan-
dard, the parties to the procedure have committed a penal offense
under section 5 (2).235 The threshold qualification for contemplation of
the procedure is the medical certification.2" The challenge in the case
at bar, made by the father, was that since the child might be born alive
via the abortion, the mother was in violation of the statute.2 7 The
court, deferring to the medical authority, stated succinctly that "it is
the doctor ... who has to make his decision on [viability] in respect of
Miss S's unborn child."2 8 8 A conflict of medical opinions existed be-
cause the father offered the testimony of another doctor that the pro-
cedure would violate the statute.
28 9
The court ruled in favor of the mother, dismissing the father's ap-
plication and allowing the abortion.240 Based on the facts of the case,
the court discounted the testimony of the physician brought in by the
father.24 The court noted that physician's testimony was "unsup-
ported by any other evidence or examination... [and] not accepted by
a wide body of eminent medical opinion and by many reputable doc-
tors. 242 Thus, the testimony of the father's physician failed to rebut
the presumption of responsible medical authority of the mother's
treating physician.
Some cases discussed in the previous section also exemplify judi-
cial attention to the presumption. For example, the English Re D.
opinion reflects both recognition of the presumption as well as the lim-
itations thereon.2 8 The Family Division court accepted that the physi-
cian's recommended course of treatment was valid unless proven un-
warranted by all the circumstances surrounding the case as regards the
child's best interests.2 " The court treated, as presumptively correct,
the medical alternatives offered by the physician to the mother, plac-
233. Id. at 1233.
234. Id. at 1234.
235. Id. at 1233-34.
236. Id. at 1234.
237. Id. at 1232-33.
238. Id. at 1238.
239. Id. at 1235-37.
240. Id. at 1241.
241. Id. at 1239-41.
242. Id. at 1241.
243. Re D. (A Minor) [1976] 1 All E.R. 326 (Fain. 1975).
244. Id.
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ing the burden on the government to prove otherwise."" 5
The government succeeded in doing so.2 4 6 Although this case rep-
resents the defeat of one doctor's opinion, and therefore, the limita-
tions of the doctrine, it nevertheless also illustrates the doctrine's
strength. The support of responsible medical authority required the
government to mount not only a legal inquiry as to the child's best
interests, but a medical one as well. 47 The mother's parental preroga-
tive could be defeated only if that support could be proven invalid.24 8
The only way the support could be proven invalid was to establish that
the treatment was factually and medically unwarranted.2 ,49 The
strength of the doctrine is seen, therefore, by the demanding burden
put upon the challenger who seeks to dispute the physician's profes-
sional judgment.
Parham v. J.R. shows acceptance of the presumption in United
States case law. 8 0 The United States Supreme Court upheld as consti-
tutional a Georgia statute allowing voluntary admission of minors to
state mental hospitals when the child's natural parents request their
admission.5 " The linchpin of the Court's reasoning was based upon the
presumption of support of responsible medical authority for the admis-
sion. First, the statute gave responsibility for temporarily admitting
minors upon parental request to the hospital supervisors.252 For final
admission, however, further medical authority was required since the
supervisors were not always physicians. The Court concluded that ad-
ding a requirement that a staff physician determine whether the statu-
tory standard for admission was met, was a sufficient basis upon which
to hold the statute constitutional in the face of the risk of parental
error in deciding to request the admission. " That risk jeopardized the
constitutionality of the statute because the child's rights required pro-
tection.2 Other concerns of the Court were to avoid infringement
upon the parental authority, promote the interests of both the state
and patients that benefit from voluntary admissions, and assure that
the law was in accordance with the demands of due process, The
Court relied upon its confidence in licensed physicians to keep the con-
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1239.
248. Id. at 1240.
249. Id. at 1241
250. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 591, 620 (1978).
251. Id. at 616.
252. Id. at 591.
253. Id. at 607.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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stitutionality of the statute intact.'66 The Court directed that an in-
quiry process by a "neutral factfinder" should include an inquiry into
the child's background, an interview with the child, authority to refuse
admission and periodic review of the child's continuing need for
commitment. 5
As to who the neutral factfinder should be, the Court stated that
"[tihe mode and procedure of medical diagnostic procedures is not the
business of judges. What is best for a child is an individual medical
decision that must be left to the judgment of physicians in each
case."' ' The Court asserted that although the judgment of medical
professionals is not inviolate and unreviewable, the presumption is
nevertheless strong.'6 9 Furthermore, while the Court conceded that
medical diagnosis is fallible and by no means error free, it found no
solution in "shifting the decision from a trained specialist using the
traditional tools of medical science to an untrained judge or adminis-
trative hearing officer after a judicial-type hearing.' 6 Rather, the
Court adhered to the presumption by stating that "[i]n general, we are
satisfied that an independent medical decision making process ... will
protect [the] children .... "261 Linking together this presumption with
the best interests of the child doctrine, the Court noted that, in medi-
cal situations, the judgment of physicians is best for the children.' 62
Even the powerful force of constitutional due process "cannot be di-
vorced from the nature of the ultimate decision that is being made.''
When the questions are essentially medical in character, the Court de-
ferred to the traditional reliance upon medical professionals rather
than the "procedural tools of judicial or administrative decision-mak-
ing. ' "'I6 The Court realized that trained medical professionals will
surely have more skill in evaluating medical situations than a layman
or legally trained factfinder .1 5 The rare exception of risk of error was
not found to contravene procedural due process rules when applied to
the generality of cases. 66 Due process does not require that the neutral
factfinder be a judge or administrative officer. 2 7 The Court implied
256. Id.at 607-08.
257. Id. at 606-07.
258. Id. at 607-08.
259. Id. at 609.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 613.
262. Id. at 608.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 611-12.
265. Id. at 612.
266. Id. at 615 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976)).
267. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 618 (1978).
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that unless the medical professional is deemed incompetent or oblivi-
ous or indifferent to the child's welfare, his opinion is to be presumed
valid." 8 For the case at bar, the Court recognized that commitment.2 "
The Parham Court noted that state statutes set the standard
under which the determinations are made as to whether a child is
abused or neglected270 In the analysis of the relationship between
medical professionals and the legal system, Parham states that a trial
court, rather than the physician, determines whether the facts of a
given case meet the statutory standard.2 ' It is the physician, however,
upon whom the court should appropriately rely to establish the medi-
cal facts2 7 1 This reliance gives rise to the presumption that a court acts
appropriately when it makes its decision based upon responsible medi-
cal authority. Furthermore, this support acts as a back-up to the pa-
rental authority by providing a juxtaposition of medical analysis with
the parental decision.272 The physician is seen as a buffer in a potential
conflict between the rights of parent and child.2 74 The Court also
stated that the state is correct to rely upon the physician's evaluation
in order to pursue its interests.2 75 Finally, the presumption that the
physician will act in the child's best medical interests is inherent in the
patient-physician relationship. 6
In Hofbauer, the effect of support of responsible medical authority
was a prominent issue.2 77 The trial court had to decide whether one
physician's unconventional treatment of Hodgkin's disease was as valid
as the conventional course of treatment.278 It determined that the al-
ternative form of treatment was valid because it was viable, and there-
fore the child was not neglected within the statutory meaning.279 The
New York Court of Appeals narrowed its inquiry to the legal issues,
having found that the evidence presented in trial court supported that
court's findings of fact. 80 The issue addressed was whether the parents
had neglected their child because they had placed him under the care
268. Id. at 604.
269. Id. at 618.
270. Id. at 604.
271. Id. at 618.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 607.
274. Id. at 610.
275. Id. at 618.
276. Id. at 609.
277. In re Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 652, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 1011, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936,
938 (1979), aff'g 65 A.D.2d 108, 411 N.Y.S.2d 416 (3d Dep't 1978).
278. Id. at 653, 393 N.E.2d at 1012, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
279. Id. at 654, 393 N.E.2d at 1012, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
280. Id., 393 N.E.2d at 1013, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
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of a physician who practiced metabolic therapy, especially after having
received the advice of physicians who advocated conventional
treatment.2
The parents' decision was challenged by the child care agency as
inadequate and ineffective.282 The Court of Appeals affirmed the dis-
missal of the challenge based upon the findings of the court below that
the physician was performing responsibly. 83 The Court of Appeals was
"unable to conclude, as a matter of law, that Joseph's parents [had]
not undertaken reasonable efforts to ensure that acceptable medical
treatment [was] being provided [to] their child."28
Most often, in cases of this nature, courts will be called upon to
resolve a "conflict in medical opinion. "286 When two or more qualified
physicians advocate different courses of treatment, both enjoy the pre-
sumption of responsible medical authority.288 Absent a showing that
the prescribed course of treatment is wholly unacceptable to the medi-
cal profession, the courts usually defer to the physician's expertise.
2 87
The courts will often inquire as to whether there is any measure of
acceptance within the medical profession as a whole regarding a given
course of treatment.2 88 Mere unorthodoxy or lack of convention does
not render a specific treatment invalid.2 89 When the measure of accept-
ance is demonstrated, the only remaining inquiry is whether it is war-
ranted for the patient's condition.'" In cases involving handicapped
newborns, consideration of the patient's condition often raises the is-
281. Id. at 651-52, 656, 393 N.E.2d at 1011, 1014, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 938, 940-41.
282. Id. at 656-57, 393 N.E.2d at 1014, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 941.
283. Id. at 657, 393 N.E.2d at 1014, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 941.
284. Id. (emphasis added).
285. See, e.g., id. at 653, 393 N.E. at 1012, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 939; see also Weber v.
Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685 (2d Dep't), afl'd per curiam, 60
N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983); In re B. (A Minor), [1981] 1.
W.L.R. 1421 (C.A. 1982); cf. In re Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Bx. Co.
Sup. Ct. 1979) (medical opinions unanimously in favor of surgery).
286. See, e.g., In re Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 657, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 1014, 419
N.Y.S.2d 936, 941 (1979), aff'g 65 A.D.2d 108, 411 N.Y.S.2d 416 (3d Dep't 1978).
287. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 618 (1978); 47 N.Y.2d at 656, 393 N.E. at
1014, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 941; Re D. (A Minor), [1976] 1 All E.R. 326 (Faro. 1975).
288. See, e.g., [1976] 1 All E.R. 326; In re B. [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421; 60 N.Y.2d at 208,
456 N.E.2d at 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 63 (1983); 101 Misc. 2d at 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 965
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
289. See e.g., Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, 687
(2d. Dep't), a/f'd per curiam, 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983);
see also 47 N.Y.2d at 648, 393 N.E.2d at 1009, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 936 (1979), aff'g 65
A.D.2d 108, 411 N.Y.S.2d 416 (3d Dep't 1978).
290. 47 N.Y.2d at 656-57, 393 N.E.2d at 1014, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 941; see also 95 A.D.2d
at 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
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sue of whether quality-of-life is an appropriate criterion for decision-
making.29
C. Quality-of-Life Considerations
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the decision-making pro-
cess is whether to consider the infant's projected quality-of-life. Mod-
ern medical technology throws the timeless value of the sanctity of life
and the attendant goals to relieve human suffering in conflict with life-
prolongation which may now entail considerable suffering.2 92 Several
lower American courts explicitly rejected quality-of-life considerations
as criteria for decision-making for treatment of handicapped
newborns. 93 Many commentators argue similarly.2 94
One commentator's "principle of sanctity of life" argument advo-
cates treatment despite the extent of deformity. 95 Another commenta-
tor's argument is based upon "salvageability," that any reasonable
hope of saving life demands treatment, without regard to whether it
can prolong life or not, nor whether it ultimately benefits the patient's
medical condition.2 9 6 The same commentator later wrote that the risk
of erroneous diagnosis as to the newborn's potential development obvi-
ates the use of quality-of-life in the decision-making process.2 " A third
commentator's argument is that determinations based on quality-of-
life considerations are subjective in nature and create a "slippery
slope" dilemma.9 ' The dilemma envisioned is that arbitrary personal
291. See infra notes 292-319 and accompanying text.
292. D. CRANE. THE SANCTITY OF SOCIAL LIFE: PHYSICIANS' TREATMENT OF CRITICALLY
ILL PATIENT 7 (1975).
293. See Note, Legal and Ethical Issues Concerning Treatment of Seriously Ill
Newborns, 30 LoY. L. REV. 925, 932 (1984) for a discussion of In re McNulty (unre-
ported); see also Maine Medical Center v. Houle, No. 74-145 (Super. Ct. Cumberland
Co., Me., filed Feb. 14, 1974) (unreported), reprinted in 1 ISSUES IN LAW & MED. 237
(1986)).
294. See P. RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE (1978) [hereinafter ETHICS]; P.
RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON (1970) [hereinafter THE PATIENT AS PERSON]; Shils, The
Sanctity of Life, in LIFE OR DEATH: ETHICS AND OPTIONS 2 (D. Labby ed. 1968); Involun-
tary Euthanasia, supra note 28.
295. Shils, supra note 294, at 30.
296. THE PATIENT AS PERSON, supra note 294, at 107.
297. ETHICS, supra note 294, at 203.
298. Involuntary Euthanasia, supra note 28, at 254-55. The "slippery slope" di-
lemma envisioned by these commentators is that subjective quality-of-life considerations
could lead to decisions not to treat handicapped newborns who have such relatively triv-
ial birth defects as missing fingers or slight mental retardation. Furthermore, they would
not rely upon any given set of parents' or physicians' decisions whether to treat, but
rather prefer legally mandated guidelines. Id.
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or cultural factors would dictate treatment decision-making.2 '9 9 The ar-
guments opposed to the use of quality-of-life considerations share as
common ground that life should be preserved without regard for the
constitution of that life, and that there should be universal mandatory
treatment."' 0
Other United States courts, however, relied on quality-of-life crite-
ria to decide whether to order treatment for handicapped newborns. 301
In In re Cicero,302 the New York State Supreme Court, Bronx County,
looked to whether the "child has a reasonable chance to live a useful,
fulfilled life." 'os Likewise, the Indiana Circuit Court, Monroe County,
found that "the value of parental autonomy outweighed the infant's
right to life where minimally adequate quality-of-life was non-exis-
tent."304 Even the United States Supreme Court made such an indica-
tion in its opinion in the landmark case of Roe v. Wade. 5 Justice
Blackmun refers to a fetus's capability for "meaningful life" outside
the mother's womb.3 0 6
This position finds support among commentators as well. One
commentator considers the infant's quality-of-life as it will affect both
the infant and the infant's family.3 0 7 When faced with "an existence of
misery and suffering both for [the infants] and for their families ... we
are not justified in prolonging the lives of these infants."30 8 The same
commentator also considers the amount of additional life which the
treatment will provide.309 The thrust of that argument is that the par-
ents' hopes will be raised for a short while (one year to eighteen
months) only to be dashed again. 10 This commentator's concern is
that the child and its parents will face the agonies of loss during the
original decision-making period and then again when the child's health
fails later on."' He asks if "anything [has] been gained by subjecting
299. Id.
300. See sources cited supra note 294.
301. See, e.g., In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004 A (Monroe Co. Cir. Ct., filed Apr.
12, 1982); see also In re Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Bx. Co. Sup. Ct.
1979).
302. 101 Misc. 2d at 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 965.
303. Id. at 702, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
304. Letter from Judge John Baker of Monroe Co. Cir. Ct. to anonymous person
(June 8, 1983) (discussing In re Infant Doe), quoted in Withholding Treatment from
Infants, supra note 28, at 235-36.
305. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
306. Id. at 163.
307. Bucy, 8 CLINIcAL NEUROSURGERY 64 (1960).
308. Id. at 65.
309. Id. at 67-68.
310. Id. at 68.
311. Id.
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these parents to the same dreaded fire twice?" ' 2
A pediatric neurosurgeon, commenting on quality-of-life consider-
ations in an interview, stated that he would respect parents' wishes not
to treat complicated cardiac and intestinal problems with surgery in
cases of infants with Down's syndrome."' 3 He bases this decision upon
the absence of a likelihood that the child will achieve sufficient partici-
pation in the life of his family.314 Another commentator likewise has
argued that infants' awareness or consciousness of life are factors to be
considered in decision-making.315 Other commentators advocating the
use of quality-of-life considerations in treatment decision-making base
their arguments on cultural and legal norms and values.""
A very subtle point pertaining to quality-of-life considerations
which distinguishes the cases of newborns from those of older children
is the availability of a reliable prognosis. 1 Medical prognosis is less
reliable the earlier in life it is made. 1 ' This exacerbates the problem of
whether quality-of-life considerations should enter the decision-making
process. When older children are victims of life-threatening maladies,
prognoses may be developed more completely.31 This can be attrib-
uted to such factors as the relatively greater medical stability of the
older person, more time in which to arrive at the prognosis, the exis-
312. Id.
313. Int'l Herald Tribune, Feb. 1, 1976, at 6.
314. Id.
315. Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, in 2 PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 37
(1972).
316. See, e.g., Morison, Death: Process or Event?, 173 Sci. 694 (1971); Sanders, Eu-
thanasia: None Dare Call It Murder, 60 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 351
(1969).
317. For examples of cases involving older children, see In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439,
321 S.E.2d 716 (1984); In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015 (La. 1982); In re Hofbauer, 47
N.Y.2d 648, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1979), af'g 65 A.D.2d 108, 411 N.Y.S.2d
416 (3d Dep't 1978); In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984). Although jurisdictions differ in their decisions in cases of older infants as well, a
reading and comparison of those cases with newborn cases reveals the difference that a
more reliable prognosis makes. One may query whether, as between older infants on the
one hand, and fetuses on the other hand, which may be terminated at the mother's uni-
lateral prerogative during the first two trimesters, newborns are treated as a special class
to whom unique legal reasonings are applied.
For accounts of cases involving court action on care of fetuses, see Courts Acting to
Force Care on the Unborn, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1987, at Al, col. 1; Charges Against
Mother in Death of Baby Are Thrown Out, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1987, at A25, col. 1; Are
Fetal Rights Equal to Infants?, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1986, at 24, col. 1; Dead Baby's
Mother Faces Criminal Charges on Acts in Pregnancy, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1986, at A22,
col. 1.
318. J. LYON, supra note 3, at 111.
319. Id.
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tence of a verbally responsive patient, the capability of the patient to
withstand more extensive diagnostic procedures and the corresponding
ability of medical professionals to apply such procedures. Furthermore,
newborns' birth defects often present more challenging and complex
prognostic difficulties than the relatively more familiar medical
problems encountered by older children.
Even if one accepts the use of quality-of-life considerations, the
call is usually for unequivocal prognoses that will make the use of qual-
ity-of-life considerations determinative as to treatment decisions. Rela-
tively reliable prognoses are not often available. Although paralysis, re-
tardation or other disabling conditions may be clearly indicated, the
extent of their harm or how far they may progress is often not.
D. Parens Patriae Authority
Common law provides the basis of parens patriae authority in the
Anglo-American system of jurisprudence.320 Innumerable cases and
statutes have relied upon and reinforced that authority to the point
where it provides a main root to the power of government in western
society.3 1
Parens patriae, literally "parent of the country," originally ap-
plied to the prerogative of the King of England as sovereign. s22 In the
United States, the prerogatives devolve to the states, and are attributes
contributing to the notion of internal sovereignty enjoyed by the
states. 23 The most literal dimension of parens patriae power is seen
when the state assumes parental authority and duty towards a minor
deprived of natural or legal parental care.32 4 Furthermore, under the
320. 67A C.J.S. Parens Patriae (1978).
321. In England, see Children and Young Persons Act, 1969, ch. 54; Re K.D. (A Mi-
nor), [1988] 2 W.L.R. 398. In the United States, see N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT §§ 1011-1074
(McKinney 1983); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); In re Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.S.2d 648,
393 N.E.2d 1009, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1979).
322. 67A C.J.S., Parens Patriae (1978).
323. 81A C.J.S. States § 16 (1978). Generally, the federal government has no inherent
domestic sovereign powers or common-law prerogatives, but rather only external sover-
eign powers and those powers which are constitutionally conferred. 91 C.J.S. United
States § 4 (1978). The specific royal prerogatives such as belonged to the King of Eng-
land in his capacity as parens patriae, however, did devolve to the federal government.
Id. One example thereof is that the King was not bound to any legislation that did not
"particularly and expressly mention him .... [however] the King shall take benefit of
any act, although he be not named." Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508, 516 (1893).
324. 43 C.J.S. Infants § 5 (1978). The earliest reported United States applications of
parens patriae pertain to the states' competence thereunder to enforce an otherwise
failed charitable trust; see Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99,
144 (1830) (Johnson, J., concurring); Beatty v. Kurtz, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 566 (1829); Trust-
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doctrine, the state has a duty to ensure "that every child within its
borders receives proper care and treatment. '3 25 Thus, the state's au-
thority over children exceeds its corresponding authority over adults. 2
The doctrine inheres enormous power in the state, which has an
obligation to exercise this power cautiously, reasonably and only with
just cause. 27 Constitutionally based parental rights act as a check on
the state's parens patriae power.328 Yet, because the function of the
state as parens patriae is so important, constitutional limitations
should be construed so as not to interfere with the legitimate exercise
thereof.'29
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE Topic CASES
A. Presumption that Parents Act in Their Child's Best Interests
and Parens Patriae
1. In Re B.
The Court of Appeal, in B., acknowledged the parental presump-
tion by stating that "great weight ought to be given to the views of the
parents, 3 - 0 and, "due weight must be given to the decision of the par-
ents which everybody accepts was an entirely responsible one, doing
what they considered best . -.1 Yet, the B. court rebutted that
presumption without further investigation, without invalidating the re-
sponsible medical authority supporting the parents' decision, and
against the findings of fact of the lower court.332 The Court of Appeal
reversed the lower court, holding the trial judge in error for respecting
the wishes of the parents and allowing their wishes to affect his reason-
ing. 83 The Court of Appeal also held that the trial judge erred by fail-
ing in his duty to reach his decision based upon the best interests of
the child.8s '
The record showed, however, that the parents' decision was so
ees of Philadelphia Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'rs, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1 (1819). Nonethe-
less, in Baptist, which contains the first United States Supreme Court mention of parens
patriae, Chief Justice Marshall discusses nearly all of the aspects of the doctrine herein-
before mentioned.
325. 43 C.J.S. Infants § 5 (1978).
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. In re B. (A Minor), [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421, 1422 (C.A. 1982).
331. Id. at 1424 (Dunn, J.).
332. Id. at 1422-24.
333. Id. at 1424 (Dunn, J.).
334. Id.
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founded, that "they genuinely believed that it was in the best interests
of their child.""' The parents asserted that the child's interests moti-
vated their decision, and not the difficulties that raising the child
presented to them. 86 The Court of Appeal's opinion characterizes the
parents as "caring ... [and] entirely responsible."33 7
The trial court had followed the statutory procedure for removal
of B. from her parents' custody. " 8 While the trial judge revoked the
portion of his order authorizing the surgery, his order giving care and
control of the child to the local authority and authorization for the
local authority to place the child for adoption and begin the adoption
proceedings remained intact.39 The Court of Appeal reinstated the re-
voked portion of the order. " The severing of the parent-child relation-
ship and overriding of the parents' decision as to the medical treat-
ment was complete.
Apparently, the Court of Appeal's only basis for rebutting the par-
ents' decision was that they could not make a responsible decision due
to the great shock of giving birth to a mongoloid child.34 ' At first, the
court, indicating the sincerity of the parents' decision, characterized it
as "agonizing 3 42 and made "with great sorrow. '3 43 The court then cites
that same emotional trauma as the basis on which to override their
decision. 3 " The court reasoned that the parents' decision was faulty
because their anguish invalidated their decision-making capabilities. 4 5
In arriving at its own decision, the Court of Appeal found the case
"difficult" 46 and "very poignantly sad. '34 7 Nevertheless, the court took
away the most cherished of parental responsibilities, the care and cus-
tody of their child. The Court of Appeal's opinion reflects neither a
thorough investigation nor a clearly reasoned foundation upon which
to justify a usurpation of the parents' prerogative.
The Court of Appeal expressed no basis upon which to negate the
trial court's finding of fact that the parents had made the decision in
the child's best interests. The local authority conceded that same
335. Id. at 1422.
336. Id. at 1423.
337. Id. at 1422-24.
338. Id. at 1422.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 1424.
341. Id. at 1422.
342. Id. at 1424 (Dunn, J.).
343. Id. at 1422.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 1424.
347. Id. at 1422.
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fact.3" 8 The Court of Appeal cited none of the "well-known princi-
ples" '49 necessary to suspend the parental right to decide medical
treatment for their child. The court dismissed the oft-cited parental
presumption, which has been characterized as the best natural protec-
tion for children, reinforced by statute and judicial precedent, on no
more a sound basis than that the parents were upset over their
dilemma.
The Court of Appeal's decision represents less than a careful exer-
cise of its wide parens patriae power against parental autonomy and a
disregard for the presumption that parents act in their child's best in-
terests. By failing to develop a sound reasoning for overriding the pa-
rental presumption, the Court of Appeal is open to the same criticism
it made of the parents; namely, that the difficulty of the situation, the
sadness and anguish involved, and the personal preferences of the jus-
tices influenced the court's decision.
2. Weber
In the Weber case, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision en-
tirely upon the statutory reflection of a parental presumption which
was under attack by a stranger to the family. 50 The court did, how-
ever, note the effects of the record below.3 51 In the trial court, the con-
troversy centered on the infant's prognosis, disregarding both the pa-
rental presumption and the responsible medical authority supporting
the parents' decision.3 52
The Appellate Division felt the need to justify the parents' choice
between treatment options, and thus concentrated on the support of
responsible medical authority. 53 The intermediate court also cited
constitutional precedent, statutory authority, and the equitable parens
patriae power of the court."5 4 That court did not emphasize the paren-
tal presumption, but noted in its conclusion that the parents were
"concerned and loving" and acted in the "best interest of the
infant. "55
348. Id. at 1423.
349. The "well-known principles" are those referred to in Re D. (A Minor), [1976] 1
All E.R. 326 (Fain. 1975).
350. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 212-13, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1188, 469
N.Y.S.2d 63, 65 (1983).
351. Id. at 213, 456 N.E.2d at 1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
352. Id. at 211, 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
353. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, 687 (2d
Dep't), aff'd per curiam, 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983).
354. Id. at 588, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
355. Id. at 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
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The New York Court of Appeals was utterly emphatic regarding
the parental presumption. Indeed, that court's entire opinion rested
upon the failure of the trial court to follow the statutorily prescribed
provisions for governmental intervention into such cases:
The requirement for court approval or authorization for pro-
ceedings prompted by those other than child protective agen-
cies indicates the Legislature's concern that judicial proceed-
ings touching the family relationship should not be casually
initiated and imposes upon the courts the obligation to exercise
sound discretion before permitting such petitions to be filed.85 6
Because the petitioner had failed "to follow the statutory scheme con-
templated ... for the protection of children" the court would not per-
mit him to "catapult ... into the very heart of a family circle, there to
challenge the most private and precious responsibility vested in the
parents for the care and nurture of their children. 3 57
The court showed distinct disdain for the "unusual, and some-
times offensive, activities and proceedings . . .sought . . .to displace
parental responsibility for and management of [Baby Jane Doe's] med-
ical care. '8 58 The fundamental legislative principles of the statutory
scheme were sufficient grounds to uphold the Appellate Division's dis-
missal of the case.
The Court of Appeals was so offended by the unwarranted, blatant
intrusion into the family's privacy that it did not even entertain the
medical merits of the case.35 The court ruled that no private person
could challenge the parental presumption. Only through the statutory
scheme could the parents and physicians be called upon "to appear in
court and justify their actions." 6 0 Its opinion stands as a tribute to the
notion of parental presumption and the standard that proceedings of
this type must be handled by the child protective agencies. 6 '
The Court of Appeals rejected consideration of every other ele-
ment of the case except the legislatively recognized parental presump-
tion. 6 2 Most appropriately, the Court of Appeals placed the state's re-
356. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 212, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1187, 469
N.Y.S.2d 63, 65 (1983) (emphasis added).
357. Id. at 213, 456 N.E.2d at 1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
358. Id. at 211, 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
359. Id. at 211-13, 456 N.E.2d at 1187-88, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64-65.
360. Id. at 213, 456 N.E.2d at 1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
361. Id. at 211-12, 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64; see also J. Lyon, supra
note 3, at 50-51.
362. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 211-13, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1187-88,
469 N.Y.S.2d 63, 64-65.
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sponsibility to intervene between parent and child squarely upon only
those who have the expertise to deal with such matters; namely, the
child protective agencies. 3 3 The Court of Appeals did not even scratch
the surface of the case beyond that consideration.3 64
Furthermore, it is important to note that the court did not remand
the case for such an investigation. Presumably, by the time the case
reached that level, the appropriate agencies were aware of the case and
could act accordingly. There is no indication, on or off the record, that
an investigation was deemed necessary by those agencies." 5 Since the
entire record was before the court, one must presume that the Court of
Appeals made its decision based upon the best interests of the child.3 66
If the court had felt that the treatment decision was wrong, or that
further investigation was necessary, it surely would have ruled differ-
ently. Thus, the approval of the Appellate Division's ruling on the mer-
its, as well as the parent's decision not to consent to surgery, is found
in the Court of Appeals's decision not to rule on these issues.
B. Support of Responsible Medical Authority
1. In Re B.
It is difficult to understand how a court would supplant the medi-
cal authority of a responsible physician without relying on conclusive
medical evidence to the contrary, but the Court of Appeal did so. The
court merely identified a "difference of medical opinion .... ,,367 The
doctor who refused to perform the surgery, testified: "'I decided there-
fore to respect the wishes of the parents and not perform the opera-
tion, a decision which would, I believe (after about 20 years in the
medical profession), be taken by the great majority of surgeons faced
with a similar situation.' "38 Two other surgeons "advised that the op-
eration should be carried out. 3 69 The trial court had ruled in favor of
the parents based on the support of responsible medical authority.
The Court of Appeal, in reversing the lower court, rejected the
widely recognized parental presumption with the unsupported state-
ment that "the decision no longer lies with the parents or the doctors,
but lies with the court. '37 0 In its reasoning, the discretion of the par-
363. Id. at 212, 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 213, 456 N.E.2d at 1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
366. Id.
367. In re B. (A Minor), [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421, 1423 (C.A. 1982).
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 1424.
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ents and supporting physician were considered merely as "evidence
and views," then summarily rejected.37' The trial court's reliance upon
the professional opinion of the surgeon respecting the parents' decision
was held as error.3 7
2
This is not to say that parents' decisions are inviolable. For exam-
ple, there have been cases, such as In re Cicero,3s 3 where the parents'
decision was entirely opposite to all medical authority, and was, there-
fore, overruled. The Cicero court stated that "[p]arental rights . . . are
not absolute," and aptly concluded that "[clertainly every physician
who prefers a course of treatment rejected by a parent is not privileged
to have the court decide upon the treatment under its parens patriae
powers. '"" A conflict existed between the parents and the baby's best
interests based on the physician's prognosis."7 In the Cicero case, the
medical opinions were unanimous that surgery was the most desirable
course of treatment.3 7
6
What is disturbing in the English court's decision is that the fate
of the child and her family was decided upon an academic application
of lofty moralistic notions, rather than the realistic human concerns of
those involved. The presumption that physicians make their recom-
mendations responsibly is valid. Without reference to any competent
review of the medical opinions, the court turned away from the well-
established precepts of parental and medical authority.
The B. court's ruling on the best interests of the child contravened
the stated position of a responsible medical authority. The court itself
termed the result as "brutal. 377
The court found that the parents' decision was "entirely responsi-
ble '378 but stated that it could not "hide behind the decision of the
parent or the decision of the doctors. 3 9 Even though the "court's first
and paramount consideration is the welfare of this unhappy little
baby," the court made its decision against the parental presumption,
against the support thereof of responsible medical authority, and
against the ruling of the lower court, ostensibly the most competent
finder of fact.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
374. Id. at 702, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 968 (citations omitted).
375. Rosenzweig Interview, supra note 28.
376. Id.
377. In re B. (A Minor), [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421, 1424 (C.A. 1982).
378. Id. at 1424 (Dunn, J.).
379. Id.
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2. Weber
Although the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate
Division decision on procedural, rather than substantive grounds, it
tacitly approved the Appellate Division's reasoning and disposition of
the case on its merits.380 Since the Appellate Division was the only
court in Weber to directly address this issue, and since its opinion re-
ceived tacit approval from the Court of Appeals, this portion of the
analysis will concentrate on the intermediate court's decision.381
The decision of the Appellate Division to uphold the parents' right
to decide stands on two grounds. The first is a genuine concern for the
child's best interests based on quality-of-life projections that the child
could be spared from an existence of almost certain endless medical
complications.3 82 The second is that the parents had made a reasonable
choice among possible medical treatments based on responsible medi-
cal authority. 83
Two physicians, a pediatric neurologist and a neurosurgeon, testi-
fied that the parents' choice of a conservative antibiotic regimen,
rather than surgery, was "well within acceptable medical standards.38 4
The pediatric neurologist testified that the course of treatment would
certainly result in the death of the infant within two years.385 While
surgery might prolong the child's life for twenty years or more, "her
existence would be a grim one." ' Thus, despite a reliance on quality-
of-life considerations, the court accepted the conservative course of
treatment which would result in a markedly shorter life span for the
infant.387
The importance of this point is that the court deferred to the
medical professionals regarding the choice of appropriate treatment.388
This position has valid legal precedent because, traditionally, the law
reposes substantial confidence in the medical decision-making pro-
cess. 8 ' The physician may appropriately consider more than just the
380. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
381. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685 (2d Dep't), afJ'd
per curiam, 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983).
382. Id. at 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 686-87.
383. Id.
384. J. LYON, supra note 3, at 47.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686-87 (2d
Dep't), afI'd per curiam, 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983).
389. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1978), which involved a decision of whether to
admit a child for psychiatric treatment. The Court's opinion, however, addressed the
general doctrines pertaining to medical treatment decision-making for minors. The
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effectiveness of treatment. The Appellate Division recognized that the
risks and ramifications of treatment, as well as the patient's prognosis,
must be included.8 90
The court implicitly indicated that it did not endorse newborn eu-
thanasia. 9' Nevertheless, the final decision must be a product of re-
sponsible medical opinion as it affects the situation as a whole, rather
than the medical evaluation exclusively. 98 The court concluded that
the parents were best able to decide, among the valid treatment op-
tions presented by the physicians, what is best for their child."
According to Parham, the appropriate review of the parents'
choices regarding medical decisions involving children should be
whether the child is abused or neglected. 94 State statutes set that
standard. 95 In Weber, the New York Court of Appeals stated that the
trial court "abused its discretion as a matter of law by permitting this
proceeding to go forward . . . in the absence of any further investiga-
tion pursuant to section 1034 of the Family Court Act."8 96 This failure
was fatal to the petitioner's case. 97
C. Quality-of-life Considerations
1. In Re B.
The B. court rejected quality-of-life as a criteria for deciding
whether to treat. The evidence showed that, untreated, the intestinal
blockage would promptly and inevitably cause the infant's death. 8
Though the infant also might die from heart trouble even if treated for
the intestinal problem, surgery was the only chance for her to live. "
Thus, the court saw the choice presented as simply one between life
and death. 00
The parents argued that if the operation was a success, and their
daughter lived the "normal span" of a person afflicted with Down's
Court's reasoning is most applicable to medical decisions because more exacting science
is applied there than in psychiatry. Id.
390. 95 A.D.2d at 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 686-87.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 586 (1978).
395. Id. at 593.
396. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 210-11, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1187, 469
N.Y.S.2d 63, 64 (1983).
397. Id. at 213, 456 N.E.2d at 1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
398. In re B. (A Minor), [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421, 1423 (C.A. 1982).
399. Id.
400. Id. at 1424.
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syndrome, she would suffer extreme mental and physical handicaps.0 1
Still, the court saw a nontreatment decision as a condemnation to
death." 2 Since the infant's quality-of-life could not be concretely es-
tablished, quality-of-life considerations were rejected as decision-mak-
ing criteria.0 3 The court concluded that because the infant's potential
quality-of-life was uncertain, and a possibility of "normal mongoloid
life" existed, life saving surgery must be performed.4 " ' The parents'
opinion that any such possibility was too remote, and that they wished
to spare their daughter the more likely consequence of a life of pro-
longed suffering, was rejected.' 5
A reading of the opinion, however, reveals quality-of-life consider-
ations made by the court which are difficult to square with the court's
conclusory statements. "On one hand the probability is that she will
not be a cabbage .... On the other hand it is certain that she will be
very severely mentally and physically handicapped."'' 0 6 Yet, the court
found "no evidence that [the] . . .child's short life is likely to be an
intolerable one [and] . . .no evidence at all as to the quality of life
which the child may expect."'0 7
The court acknowledged the possibility of quality-of-life consider-
ations in other cases by stating: "There may be cases, I know not, of
severe proven damage where the future is so certain and where the life
of the child is so bound to be full of pain and suffering that the court
might be driven to a different conclusion ....""' Yet, in resolving the
case at bar the court stated that:
The evidence in this case only goes to show that if the opera-
tion takes place and is successful, then the child may live the
normal span of a mongoloid child with the handicaps and de-
fects and life of a mongoloid child, and it is not for this court
to say that life of that description ought to be extinguished. 09
Apparently, because the court could not concretely establish the
infant's quality-of-life prospects, it rejected that criteria in determin-
ing whether the surgery was in the child's best interests.
The parents were satisfied that the medical outlook for their
401. Id. at 1423. The life span referred to is 20 to 30 years. Id.
402. Id. at 1424.
403. Id. at 1422-24.
404. Id. at 1424.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 1423 (emphasis added).
407. Id. at 1424 (Dunn, J.).
408. Id. at 1424.
409. Id. (emphasis added).
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daughter warranted a decision not to treat. "[T]he parents ... took the
view that it would be unkind to operate on her . .. ",410 No untoward
motives were ascribed. The court emphatically sympathized with the
parents' agony and genuine concern for their infant's welfare." The
court acknowledged the presumption of the parents' rights by noting
that "great weight ought to be given to the views of the parents . . .
"412 Ultimately, however, the court usurped the parents' prerogative to
decide, even though no proof was presented to show that the parents'
decision was faulty.413 The court seems to have agreed with the com-
mentators who believe that error in such decisions must be made in
favor of life, without regard for what that life may hold.414
2. Weber
In contrast, the Appellate Division did not reject quality-of-life
considerations. 41 5 Rather, it deferred to the parents' evaluation of the
infant's projected quality-of-life. It recognized as valid a parental deci-
sion which was based on an evaluation of quality-of-life possibilities.
Though surgery meant a considerable prolongation of the infant's life,
it would not cure her anticipated paralysis and retardation. 4 ' Alterna-
tively, though death was not imminent, without surgery the infant
would certainly die within two years.4 17 Further characterization of the
infant's prognosis included a life of nasogastric feeding, 418 incontinence
with constant bladder and kidney infections, extreme physical discom-
fort, absence of meaningful interaction with her environment, no capa-
bility of interpersonal relationships and no likelihood of any cognitive
skills development.419
A. Lawrence Washburn, a Vermont right-to-life attorney, who was
a complete stranger to the infant and her family, had filed suit to com-
pel the surgery.420 Espousing the anti-quality-of-life view, Washburn
410. Id. at 1422.
411. Id. at 1422-24.
412. Id. at 1422.
413. Id. at 1424.
414. See supra notes 294-300 and accompanying text.
415. Discussion of the merits of the Weber case relies on the Appellate Division deci-
sion. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
416. J. LYON, supra note 3, at 46.
417. Id. at 47.
418. Nasogastric feeding is facilitated by a plastic tube inserted through the nose and
leading to the stomach. This is used for patients who cannot swallow. TABER'S
CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 529 (14th ed. 1981).
419. J. LYON, supra note 3, at 47.
420. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 211, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1187, 469
N.Y.S.2d 63, 64 (1983); see also J. Lyon, supra note 3, at 46.
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stated: "No matter what the child's condition is, she still has the same
right to life that you and I have."'""
The Appellate Division saw the case in a different light. The court
weighed the medical outlooks, with and without surgery:
The record confirms that the failure to perform the surgery
will not place the infant in imminent danger of death, although
surgery might significantly reduce the risk of infection. On the
other hand, successful results could also be achieved with an-
tibiotic therapy. Further, while the mortality rate is higher
where conservative medical treatment is used, in this particular
case the surgical procedures also involved a great risk of de-
priving the infant of what little function remains in her legs,
and would also result in recurring urinary tract and possibly
kidney infections, skin infections and edemas of the limbs.'22
Furthermore, a decision not to operate would leave the infant with a
worsening hydrocephalic condition,2 " progressively impairing any in-
tellectual functions.'2
Thus, rather than try to make the quality-of-life decision itself at
the sake of the parents' right to decide for their child, the court recog-
nized that the parents' decision, made in good faith, truly represented
the best interests of the child. 2" The New York Court of Appeals up-
held the dismissal of the petition. While focusing on the rejection of
Washburn's invasion of the family privacy, the court also noted that
"it does not appear that the petitioner had any direct or personal
knowledge of the facts relating to the child's condition, the treatment
she is presently receiving or the factors which prompted her parents to
adopt the course they have."' 26 The New York court allowed the par-
ents to evaluate the quality-of-life meaning for their child and decide
accordingly.
V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
The best interests of the child doctrine serves the broad purpose
of application in cases of custody, divorce, adoption, neglect, abuse and
nearly every civil legal proceeding involving a child. Unfortunately,
421. J. LYON, supra note 3, at 46 (quoting a telephone interview with A. Lawrence
Washburn, a Vermont attorney (Apr. 25, 1984)).
422. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, 687-88 (2d
Dep't), aff'd per curiam, 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983).
423. For a description of hydrocephalus, see 95 A.D.2d at 588, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
424. J. LYON, supra note 3, at 47-50.
425. 95 A.D.2d at 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
426. 60 N.Y.2d at 212, 456 N.E.2d at 1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 65 (emphasis added).
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there are no concrete rules or even guidelines to aid the courts in de-
termining the constitution of that doctrine. At best, the doctrine re-
quires the courts to show sound reasoning as to why its conclusion is in
the best interests of the child.
It is here that the Weber courts produced a logical, legally valid
reasoning to serve that doctrine. First, the legislative scheme recog-
nizes the presumption that the parents will act in the child's best in-
terests. 2 7 That presumption prompts the law to forbid any untoward
interference with the parent-child relationship. Only the expertise of
the child protective agencies can authorize such an interference.4 28
Even the courts are precluded from unilateral interference, but can
merely direct an agency to investigate and report on whether a pro-
ceeding should be initiated. 29 Second, the court recognizes and defers
to responsible medical authority.2 0 Third, when appropriate, quality-
of-life considerations may be taken into account.4 3 ' Again, only the
properly equipped agency has the power of review. Finally, after the
first two tests are met, the decision as to treatment can be overruled
only when it is proven that the best interests of the child are not
served.43' Therefore, the burden of proof will fall on the challenger,
and will require the concurrence of the child protective agency.4 33
Except for the parental prerogative and the best interests of the
child concept, the Court of Appeal's B. opinion is starkly devoid of any
reference to precedent, statutory law or legal doctrine. 34 Although
there are scant implications to other legal concepts-such as support of
responsible medical authority, right to life and death, and parens pa-
triae-they are not raised, addressed or utilized by the Court of Ap-
peal in arriving at its decision. 35 Rather, they are summarily dis-
counted by a notion which the court left equally undeveloped; namely,
that any treatment decision must be made in favor of life without re-
gard for what the nature of that life might be.436
The B. court's approach proves to be haphazard, failing in both
logic and reasoning. The parental presumption is discounted because
of the emotional trauma the parents experienced from the birth of a
427. Id. at 211-12, 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
428. Id. at 212, 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
429. Id.
430. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686-87 (2d
Dep't), aff'd per curiam, 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983).
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. See id.
434. In re B. (A Minor), [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421, 1422-23 (C.A. 1982).
435. Id. at 1421.
436. Id. at 1422-24.
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handicapped child.4 3 7 Although the "great majority of surgeons" would
respect the parents' wishes, despite the trauma, 38 the court does not
agree with the judgment of medical professionals about a medical is-
sue. The court alternately identifies quality-of-life considerations, then
denies that they exist. When the parents make a good faith decision,
taking quality-of-life into account, the court rejects the acceptance of
support of responsible medical authority for that decision.3 9
The court replaces its own medically untrained and uneducated
discretion for that of the treating physician when a difference in medi-
cal opinions arises. Finally, the court indicates that, if necessary, the
child can be treated and removed from the parents' custody perma-
nently, and can be placed for adoption.4 0 The court acknowledges that
the parents' decision was made in the child's best interests, rather then
with a view towards the difficulties presented to them.441 The court's
remedy of adoption is unsupported by any reasoning at all, other than
convenierice to arrive at the drastic and harsh measure of invading the
privacy of the family unit.
Though the crux of the issue in these cases is certainly the best
interests of the child, as it should be, there is also a strong secondary
element of the autonomy and stability of the family unit. The absolu-
tist position that all life must be preserved at all costs is flawed.4 2 The
difficulties of such decision-making dilemmas are obvious. Commenta-
tors have stated that ultimately, the courts are no better equipped to
make these decisions than family members or physicians. 443 The effects
on the family as a whole must be considered. The professional and eth-
ical integrity of the health care professionals come into play. The costs,
benefits and burdens to society must be considered.
The Weber courts' approach represents a far more equitable solu-
tion than the English court. Therein, the rights of all parties are given
due weight." 4 The difficulty of decision-making is inescapable. Only
with the logical application of sound legal doctrines do the courts serve
the ends of justice. The B. court, in arbitrarily blocking out the valid
legal rights and concerns of the parents and physicians, does not serve
437. Id. at 1422, 1424; see supra notes 341-45 and accompanying text.
438. Id. at 1423.
439. Id. at 1424; see supra notes 367-79 and accompanying text.
440. Id. at 1422-24.
441. Id.
442. See Newman, Treatment Refusals for the Critically and Terminally III: Pro-
posed Rules for the Family, the Physician and the State, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. HuM. RTS. ANN.
35, 85 (1985).
443. Id.; see also Longino, Withholding Treatment from Defective Newborns: Who
Decides and on What Criteria?, 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 377 (1983); Riga, supra note 9, at 109.
444. See supra notes 54-99, 350-66, 380-97, 415-26 and accompanying text.
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the best interests of the child. The court cannot be more concerned for
the infant's rights than are the "caring, responsible '445 parents. The
court is not as well-equipped as the treating physician or a child pro-
tective agency to weigh the medical options. Unilateral, emotional deci-
sions dictated by the personal preferences of the justices cannot be the
rule of law.
In England, the rule of law now stands, as a result of the B. case,
that virtually any chance for life must be pursued absolutely.44 The
Court of Appeal's opinion does not give the judicial system clear guide-
lines by which to decide future cases. In the case of handicapped
newborns, prognoses are often unavailable or unreliable immediately
after birth. In such cases, the English court's rule is to order treatment
without regard for the plethora of attendant circumstances surround-
ing the case and affecting the lives of those concerned.
The New York court presents a much more applicable rule. Statu-
tory child abuse and neglect schemes, which are present in every state
of the United States and England, serve as appropriate foundations for
dealing with these cases. The parental presumption must maintain
high recognition, particularly when supported by responsible medical
authority. The New York court sets forth a rule whereby parental deci-
sions can be overturned only by those with the expertise to make an
informed, intelligent review."" Treatment decisions often present no
preferable options. They are virtually always emotionally wrenching
and scarring. Only through deference to the emotional and personal
sensibilities of the parties involved can the courts achieve results that
truly serve the best interests of the child.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is, perhaps, no other type of case entertained by the Anglo-
American system of jurisprudence that moves the court processes more
rapidly than a case which concerns the immediate health of a child.
The sleeping giant of justice wakes and moves with almost unbeliev-
able speed when the pained cry of an infant calls upon the law for
resolution of its dilemma. The largest financial dealings, the most im-
portant of treaties between nations, and even the heavy hand of crimi-
nal justice are all subject to the politics, delaying tactics and vagaries
that may influence judicial systems. Not so when the awesome author-
ity of parens patriae comes to the rescue of a child.
The English Court of Appeal heard the B. case the same day as
445. In re B. (A Minor) [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421, 1422-24.
446. Id. at 1421-24; see supra notes 402-14 and accompanying text.
447. See supra notes 82-99, 350-66 and accompanying text.
19881
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
the trial court decision was rendered. 4 The "Baby Jane Doe" case
sped through the three levels of the New York State court system in
two weeks." 9 The prosecutor in the Bloomington, Indiana "Baby Doe"
case believed that the United States Supreme Court would hear an
emergency appeal upon which a child's health or life depended within
twenty-four hours of petition.""0
When a child's welfare is immediately at stake all the usual
facades and frustrations incumbent upon the judicial system fall away.
When the court steps into a role of responsibility for the welfare of its
children, it is perhaps the singular instance when the parties actually
receive all the effort at which courts otherwise merely make a pretense.
Parens patriae is one of the most powerful and deeply rooted doc-
trines in the legal system of western societies. There is no question
that power will be exercised on behalf of children's welfare. Its founda-
tion lies in common law, constitutional law, statutory authority, and
general powers of law and equity courts.
For cases of this sort, adjudicatory forums are the preferable reso-
lution device, rather than legislative or administrative remedies. In the
vast majority of cases, parents and physicians decide most effectively
how the best interests of the child will be served. The courts need only
hear those cases where a dispute arises between the family and the
health care providers. Natural parental concern, widely recognized as a
presumption, provides an adequate check on irresponsible decision-
making. Professional ethics and hospital administrative oversight effec-
tively temper a physician's discretion. When parents and physician dis-
agree, then the courts are available.
As adjudicatory forums and finders of fact, the courts are well-
equipped to marshall the appropriate evidence and balance the com-
peting interests. Court-appointed guardians will protect the infant's in-
terests and provide the information required by the court. The courts
may demand whatever additional expert testimony is needed. Tempo-
rary court directives can prevent deterioration of tenuous medical and
custody situations while proceedings are pending. Furthermore, courts
can maintain jurisdiction as long as is necessary to insure proper reso-
lution of all the issues involved. 5" The courts also provide appeal
448. [1981] 1 W.L.R. at 1423.
449. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685 (2d Dep't), affd
per curiam, 60 N.Y.2d 208, 213, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, 65 (1983).
450. J. LYON, supra note 3, at 44, 57.
451. For example, the "Baby Jane Doe" trial court was still resolving matters con-
nected with the case as recently as 1988. See Baby Doe Guardian Gets Attorney's Fee,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 14, 1988, at 1, col. 3. Judge Tannenbaum limited the compensation of
Baby Jane Doe's guardian ad litem, William E. Weber, to "fees incurred by representing
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mechanisms. No other formal body has the experience and necessary
authority to adequately resolve the issues of such enormous complexity
and weight.
For the courts to administer justice in such cases, however, it is, of
course, essential that clear rules of law be established by sound legal
reasoning. When complex, intimate, familial interests are at stake,
precedents created must have the flexibility to take into account the
situations of the individuals involved. Family autonomy and privacy
cannot be compromised without compelling justification.
The courts must clarify which factors will be considered in balanc-
ing the competing rights of the child and parents, or indeed whether
any competition exists at all. The best interests of the child doctrine
does not provide a concrete standard. The absolutist position of
mandatory treatment does not work because it fails to take into ac-
count all the circumstances surrounding the case. Repeated invasion by
surgical medical procedures may not decrease, but rather increase the
infant's suffering. This may occur at the added sacrifice of severe emo-
tional and financial strain on the family unit.
The decision in the United States case reflects the aforementioned
positive elements. When the choice is left to the parents, the fact that
her in trial and at the Appellate Division." Id. The court denied Weber compensation for
appeals made to the New York Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court,
reasoning that Weber's authority as guardian expired after the Appellate Division's dis-
missal of the proceedings. Id. According to the court's order, Suffolk County must pay
Weber's compensation for its "failure to assert the child's rights by aggressively partici-
pating at least in a full exploration of the critical issues involved." Id. Judge Tannen-
baum also would not charge any portion against Baby Jane Doe's parents or Stony Brook
Hospital. The charge against the parents, he said, "would be inequitable and counter-
productive" after all they had been through. Id. The hospital was a mere "bystander."
Id.
The county asked the court to charge the guardian's fees against A. Lawrence Wash-
burn, who had initiated the original proceedings. The court denied the request, main-
taining that he had been superceded by the guardian and "excluded from direct partici-
pation in the proceedings." Id. Washburn had, however, joined Weber later in "filing the
unsuccessful petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court." Id. Subse-
quently, Washburn sought appointment of another guardian in United States federal
court. That court found his motion unnecessary and fined him $500. Id.
That a guardian might not receive, or even seek, a guardian's fee in such a case is
not unusual. The Cicero guardian, Simon Rosenzweig, waived his fee, which would have
had to have been paid by the hospital treating the infant, because the hospital had initi-
ated the case. Rosenzweig Interview, supra note 28. Mr. Rosenzweig felt, personally, that
taking a fee from the hospital, which had no fund for such payment, would discourage
the hospital from initiating child protective actions. Id. Despite the long hours, immedi-
ate attention, and disruption of other cases required of a guardian ad litem in a handi-
capped newborn case, Mr. Rosenzweig believes that the infants' best interests are served
by encouraging the hospitals' diligence. Id.
1988]
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there is a choice remains. Those faced with the dilemma of decision-
making have the choice to reject a non-treatment option if it is offen-
sive. If personal preferences are to be involved, they should surely be
those of the parents, who must live with the consequences thereof. If
the court deems to overrule the parents, it must provide clear, compel-
ling justification therefor. When the decision is left to personal prefer-
ences, those of the justices are no more valid than the parents and
physicians involved.
The courts must set forth clear legal rules because these events are
so emotionally traumatic and potentially devastating. Parents and phy-
sicians should have notice as to the legality of the available treatment
options. They should not face the added burden of litigation of the
issues while the infant lies suffering.
The rule of the United States court is superior because it provides
clear guidelines as to how the best interests of the child are served,
while intruding minimally on family autonomy and privacy. It recog-
nizes the parental and medical authority presumptions, the proper role
of the appropriate state agencies, and consideration of familial as well
as individual interests.
The English court establishes only one clear rule: if a definite
prognosis cannot be made, then the infant must be treated. Given the
practical impossibility- of achieving a reliable prognosis for handi-
capped newborns at birth, the B. case stands as a virtual edict for uni-
versal mandatory treatment. The Court of Appeal failed in its opportu-
nity to set the law on a clear course in a newly emerging area of legal
contention.
Advances in medical technology create legal dilemmas that are on
the cutting edge of the law for family and individual rights, health care
providers and professionals, and governmental responsibilities and
powers of intervention. Just as the technological developments tran-
scend national and jurisdictional boundaries, so must the resolutions of
the dilemmas. It is incumbent upon the law to achieve adequate reso-
lutions which will simultaneously preserve the values of societies, fami-
lies, individuals and professionals. The issues involved are the very
roots of civilized society: life, death and family. Therefore, the ques-
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tions must be pondered with reliance upon all the sophistication and
insight that the community of nations can provide. Only with such
concurrence will the solutions we find be valid.
William L. Bouregy

